# United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



## APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

## 76-6063

### United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Docket No. 76-6063

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

ONE 1974 CADILLAC ELDORADO SEDAN, SERIAL NO. 6L47S4Q407966,

Defendant-Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

#### APPENDIX FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

ROBERT B. FISKE, Jr., United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant



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### CIVIL DOCKET

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JUDGE WEINFELD

Jury demand date:

TITLE OF CASE		<b>ATTORNEYS</b>	ATTORNEYS			
		For plaintiff:				
INITARY CHAMPS OF AVE	BICA	Paul J. Curran, US Attorney for the SDNY				
UNITED STATES OF AME	RICA	U.S. Courthouse - Foley Sonare, NY 10	Paul J. Curran, US Attorney for the SDNY U.S. Courthouse - Foley Square, NY 10007			
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		For defendant:	-			
		Michael P. Direnzo				
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DATE	PROCEEDING	Data Orde
Oct.15-74	Filed complaint and issued summons.	Judgment 1
Dec.4-7	Filed complaint and issued summons. Filed warrant for arrest for article in rem with marshal's return	
	with proof of publication.	
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27-28-75	PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE HELD BY TO A Society Filed government's request for admissions.	
J-04-15 /	Wiled Claimant admissions made manus to C	<del> </del>
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37-66-15	of this matter	ce
107-75	PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE HELD BY 77 - W. +40	
10-00-15	Elied Consent pre-trial Orden-Weinfeld Y	<b></b>
12-30-75	Non-Jury trial begun before: Weinfeld. J and concluded decision reserved Filed CPINICN #43546The decree of forfeiture is denied, and the car shall be	
	released to the claimant Weinfeld, J. m/n	
12-31-75	Piled pltf's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law	
	Piled deft's trial memorandum of law Piled pltf's trial memorandum of law	
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	the the works yould's de released to the claimant is stayed nanding dates	1 071.01
3-01-76	made and by the Diti. Whether to anneal that declaton	
,	Filed Order and Judgment, that forfeiture is denied, the complaint is dismissed and the U.S. A. 18 directed to release the vehicle to the claimant, without	
	prejunice to any claims that may be asserted against the webtale by the T.	~
	nal Revenue Serivce for taxes assessed against Ivan Santiago-Weinfeld, J.	
03-09-76	Filed transcript of record of proceedings dated 12-1-76.	
34-05-78	Transfer of appeal to the USCA for the 2nd Circuit	
	from judgment denying forfeiture copy mailed to Michael P. Diren.	o, Esc
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff

E

JUDGE Weinfeld

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE.

One 1974 Cadillac **Eidora**do Defendant

-V-

IN TESTIMONY UNITEDF, I have caused the seal of the said Court to be hereunto affixed, at the City of New York, in the Southern District of New York, this <u>5th</u> day of <u>Mey</u>, in the year of our Lord, One thousand nine hundred and seventy six, and of the Independence of the United States the <u>200th</u> year.

Clark of the Court

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

74 Civ. 4508

-against-

ONE 1974 CADILLAC ELDORADO SEDAN, SERIAL NO. 6L4754Q407966,

OPINION

Defendant.

#43646

THOMAS J. CAHILL, ESQ.
United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York
One St. Andrew's Plaza
New York, New York

Attorney for Plaintiff

PETER C. SALERNO, ESQ. Assistant United States Attorney Of Counsel

MICHAEL P. DIRENZO, ESQ. 15 Columbus Circle New York, New York

Attorney for Claimant

IICROFILM Dec 3.1 1975

(8)

SDAN WIMFELD, O. J.

The government seized and seeks forfeiture of a Cadillac car pursuant to 21 U.S.C., section 881(a), which provides:

"The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them:

(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of [contraband]."

The owner of the seized car is Ivan Santiago, the claimant herein. On June 7, 1974, he drove the vehicle, in which also was seated Hiram "Pete" Montanez, to 305 East 24th Street, New York City, where one Arlene Carlton resided. They left the car and entered the apartment, where Santiago and Montanez discussed with Joseph P. Salvemini, an undercover agent, a sale of cocaine. They failed to agree on the mechanics of the proposed transaction and their negotiations terminated inconclusively. Both Santiago and Montanez then left the area by the

Cadillac car. Three days later, on June 10, Montanez alone met with Salvemini at a restaurant at Broadway and 92nd Street, New York City, where they agreed upon a sale of one-eighth kilogram of cocaine for \$4,000, and later that evening Montanez delivered the cocaine to Salvemini at the Carlton apartment. Santiago was not present on June 10 on either occasion, that is, when the sale of the one-eighth kilogram was negotiated or when it was delivered. The evidence does not establish that the Cadillac car transported Montanez to the place of negotiation or the place of delivery on June 10.

On June 11, 1974, Montanez and Salvemini again met at the restaurant at Broadway and 92nd Street, New York City, whereupon Montanez agreed to sell to the undercover agent a kilogram of cocaine. Saltiago was not present. That evening, after leaving Santiago's apartment and while driving a car (not the Cadillac car here at issue) to meet Salvemini to consummate the sale of the kilogram of cocaine negotiated earlier that day, Montanez was arrested and the cocaine was found in the car he was driving. Later that evening Santiago was arrested. The following day, pursuant to a search warrant, his apartment

was searched and a quantity of cocaine, marijuana, narcotics equipment and \$26,629 in currency were confiscated. Later that day, June 12, 1974, Santiago's Cadillac car was seized. The sole reason for its seizure was its use five days earlier to transport Santiago and Montanez to the East 24th Street premises where the meeting had been held and the negotiations for the initial sale of cocaine had ended inconclusively.

and Carlton, charged with conspiracy to distribute narcotics. Santiago pleaded guilty and acknowledged that
he and others met at the Carlton apartment on June 7,

1974, and there negotiated for the sale of cocaine that
(1)

Montanez "made the next day." Thus the issue is
whether the Cadillac car that transported Santiago and
Montanez to the premises where they discussed a proposed
sale of cocaine, which meeting was an overt act under the
indictment, was a conveyance "used, or . . intended for
use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the
transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment
of" the cocaine.

<sup>(1)</sup> The first sale was made on June 10, not June 8.

Montanez planned to make delivery of the cocaine at the premises on East 24th Street on June 7, the day they drove the car there to negotiate with the under-cover agent. So, too, the government does not contend, nor do the facts support a claim that the car was used on that occasion to transport the illicit drugs or as a place to negotiate the sale or as a decoy or lookcut vehicle in connection with the transaction. Its sole use was to transport Santiago and Montanez to the site of the area where the proposed purchase was first discussed.

The government contends that this use of the vehicle facilitated the subsequent sale within the meaning of the statute. However, where the contraband is not in the vehicle, what "constitutes 'facilitation' is a question of degree, which is in turn a question of fact not (2) readily susceptible to generalization." The mere fact that a vehicle is used as an ordinary means of transportation to convey one to the site of a crime does not necessarily mean that its use was to facilitate the illicit

<sup>(2)</sup> United States v. One Dodge Coupe, 43 F. Supp. 60, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (Rifkind, J.).

transaction so as to require forfeiture of the vehicle.

More must be shown. I agree with the conclusion of Judge

Bownes, who recently explored the matter at length, that

to be forfeited a vehicle must have some substantial con
nection to, or be instrumental in the commission of, the

(4)

underlying activity which the statute seeks to prevent.

In the instant case, other than a means of normal transportation of Santiago and Montanez to East 24th Street, the car had no relationship, direct or indirect, to the narcotics transactions which was consummated was forw fame days thereafter. It had no more impact upon the contemplated transaction than if they had walked there, travelled there from outside the city by plane and landed at a heliport on East 23rd Street, or reached their destination by subway.

The decree of forfeiture is denied, and the car shall be released to the claimant.

Dated: New York, N. Y.
December 30, 1975

United States District Jac

<sup>(3)</sup> Cf. Simpson v. United States, 272 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. One 1952 Ford Victoria, 114 F. Supp. 458, 460 (N.D. Cal. 1953).

<sup>(4)</sup> United States v. One 1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp. 1200 (D.N.H. 1974).

PCS:1q d-292

Walter To

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JUDGE WEINFELD

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,



CIV. 4508

Plaintiff,

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

74 Civ.

One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, : Serial No. 6L47S40407966,

Defendant.

S DISTRICT CON

Plaintiff, United States of America, 1, OF attorney, Paul J. Curran, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, for its complaint alleges upon information and belief:

- 1. This is an action for forfeiture brought by the United States of America pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §881.
- 2. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \$\$1345 and 1355, and 21 U.S.C. \$881.
- 3. The defendant in rem ("the vehicle") is a 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, Serial No. 6L4784Q407966, bearing New York registration 681 XJD, and registered to Ivan Santiago, 92 Wadsworth Avenue, New York, New York.
- 4. On or about June 7, 1974, the vehicle was used to facilitate the sale of a controlled substance, to wit, a quantity of cocaine.
- 5. On or about June 11, 1974, the vehicle was seized at Dick Gidrom Cadillac, Inc., 696 East Fordham Road, Bronx, New York, by agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration.
- 6. Pollowing seizure, the vehicle was processed and stored, and is presently stored, at the Drug Enforcement Administration Garage, 55th Street and Eleventh Avenue, New York, New York.

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7. By reason of the foregoing, the vehicle is subject to forfeiture to the United States of America pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §881.

wherefore, plaintiff United States of America respectfully requests that this Court issue a warrant for the arrest of the vehicle, that all persons having an interest in the vehicle be notified to appear herein and show cause why forfeiture should not be decreed, and that this Court decree forfeiture of the vehicle and its disposition pursuant to law, and award the plaintiff the costs and disbursements of this action.

Dated: New York, New York
October 11, 1974

PAUL J. CURRAN United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff

y: Velly C.

PETER C. SALERNO Assistant United States Attorney Office and Post Office Address:

United States Courthouse

Foley Square

New York, New York 10007 Telephone: (212) 791-1959

#### VERIFICATION

STATE OF NEW YORK )
COUNTY OF NEW YORK : 86.
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK )

deposes and says that he is an Assistant United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and as
Buch has charge of the above entitled action; that he
has read the foregoing complaint

and knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true of his own knowledge, except as to those matters herein stated to be alleged on information and belief and that as to those matters he believes it to be true.

That the sources of deponent's information and the grounds of  $_{\rm BLS}$  belief are official records and files of the United States.

That the reason this verification is made by deponent and not by plaintiff is that the plaintiff is a corporation sovereign.

PETER C. SALERNO Assistant United States Attorney

Sworn to before me this

15 H day of October, 1974

RALPH L. LEE Totary Public, State of New York No. 41 252508 Opening County No. 41 252508 Opening County

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, :

-v-

One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan : Serial No. 614754Q407966;

Defendant.

ANSWER

74 Civ. 4508 (E.W.)

Defendant, by its attorney, Michael P. Direnzo, as and for its answer to the complaint, sets forth and alleges as follows:

l. Denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph "4" of the complaint.

WHEREFORE, defendant demands judgment dismissing the complaint together with the costs and disbursements of this action.

Dated: New York, New York

December 23, 1974.

MICHAEL P. DIRENZO
Attorney for Defendant
Office and P.O. Address
15 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10023
541-7740-1

2558

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

-V-

Plaintiff,

REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS

74 Civ. 4508 (E.W.)

One 1974 CADILLAC ELDORADO SEDAN, : Serial No. 6L47S4Q407966,

----X

Defendant.

Plaintiff, the United States of America, Aereby requests that claimant, Ivan Santiago, within 30 days of the service of this request, make the following admissions for the purpose of this action only and subject to all pertinent objections to admissibility which may be interposed at trial, pursuant to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

That each of the following statements is true:

- 1. On June 7, 1974, Ivan Santiago, operating the defendant vehicle, parked it in the vicinity of 305 East 24th Street, New York, New York.
- 2. Santiago and his passenger, Hiram "Pete" Montanez, left the defendant vehicle and proceeded to the apartment of Arlene Carlton, apartment #19D, 305 East 24th Street, New York, New York.
- 3. While in that apartment, Santiago agreed to sell 1 kilogram of cocaine to a person present in the apartment.
- 4. Thereafter, Santiago and Montanez left 305 East 24th Street, entered the defendant vehicle, and drove away.

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5. Santiago did not reside at 305 East 24th Street on June 7, 1974, and had no proprietary interest in that apartment on that date.

Dated: New York, New York

July 25 , 1975.

PAUL J. CURRAN United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff

Rv.

PETER C. SALERNO
Assistant United States Attorney
Office and Post Office Address:
United States Courthouse Annex
One St. Andrew's Plaza
New York, New York 10007
Telephone: (212) 791-1979

TO: MICHAEL P. DIRENZO, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant
and Claimant
15 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

-v-

One 1974 CADILLAC ELDORADO SEDAN, Serial No. 6L47SQ407966,

Defendant.

74 Cix 4508 EW

P 4 2 13 P

Claimant, by MICHAEL P. DIRENZO, his

attorney, makes the following admissions for the purpose of this action only and subject to all pertinent objections to admissability which may be interposed at trial, pursuant to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Admits allegations and recitals marked "1",

"2", "4" and "5".

Denies allegation and recital marked "3".

Dated: New York, New York September 3rd, 1975

MICHAEL P. DIRENZO
Attorney for Claimant
Office and P.O. Address
15 Columbus Circle
New York, N.Y. 10023

TO: PAUL J. CURRAN
U.S. Attorney for
Southern District of New York
1 St. Andrew's Plaza
New York, New York 10007

A 17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

: PRE-TRIAL ORDER

Plaintiff,

: 74 Civ. 4508(E.W.)

1975

ORADO SEDAN,

ONE 1974 CADILLAC ELDORADO SEDAN, Serial No. 6L47S4Q407966,

Defendant.

The Honorable Gerard L. Goettel, United States

Magistrate, having on September 10, 1975 directed the parties
to prepare a pre-trial order in this matter, it is hereby

Ordered, that the following shall constitute the pre-trial order in this action:

#### I. Jurisdictional Statement

This Court's jurisdiction of this action is predicated upon 21 U.S.C. § 881 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345 and 1355.

#### II. Undisputed Facts

The parties agree that the following facts are not in dispute in this action:

- The registered owner of the defendant in rem ("the vehicle") is Ivan Santiago, the claimant in this action.
- 2. On or about June 11, 1974, the vehicle was seized in Bronx County, New York by agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration.
- Following seizure, the vehicle was processed and stored at the Drug Enforcement Administration Garage,
   Sth Street and Eleventh Avenue, New York, New York.
- 4. On June 7, 1974, at about 5:00 P.M., Ivan .

  Santiago, operating the defendant vehicle, parked it in the vicinity of 305 East 24th Street, New York, New York.

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(A) 4

- 5. Santiago and his passenger, Hiram "Pete" Montanez, left the defendant vehicle and proceeded to the apartment of Arlene Carlton, apartment #19D, 305 East 24th Street, New York, New York.
- 6. Thereafter, Santiago and Montanez left 305 East 24th Street, entered the defendant vehicle, and drove away.
- 7. The visit described in paragraphs 4 through 6 above was the only occasion on which Santiago visited 305 East 24th Street on June 7, 1974.
- 8. Santiago did not reside at 305 East 24th Street on June 7, 1974 and had no proprietary interest in that apartment on that date.
- 9. On May 12, 1975 Ivan Santiago pleaded guilty to Count I of Indictment No. 74 Cr. 623, before the Honorable Constance Baker Motley, United States District Judge, Southern District of New York. That count charged Santiago, Montanez, and Arlene Carlton with conspiracy to distribute narcotics. One of the overt acts charged in that count reads as follows: "On or about June 7, 1974 the defendants Arlene Carlton, Hiram Montanez and Ivan Santiago had a conversation."
- 10. At the time he pleaded guilty, Mr. Santiago was asked the following question in open Court by Assistant United States Attorney Paul Vizcarrondo:

"I would ask him if he agreed with Hiram Montanez to sell cocaine to certain indi-viduals, whether he met with Hiram Montanez and other individuals in Arlene Carlton's apartment on about June 7, 1974, and there negotiated for sale of cocsine that Hiram Montanez eventually made the next day."

- [By the Court]: Did you hear he statement of the United States Attorney?
- A [Mr. Santiago]: Yes, your Honor.
- Q Do you agree with that statement?
- A Yes, your Honor.

- Q That you agreed with Montanez to sell a Quantity of cocaine and you met with him?
- A Yes, your Honor." (Tr. 11-12)

#### III. Factual Contentions

- A. Plaintiff's contentions
- 1. At a meeting in Arlene Carlton's apartment on June 7, 1974, to which Santiago had driven in the defendant vehicle, Santiago had a general discussion with others, including an undercover agent, with respect to the sale to the agent of large quantities of cocaine. Santiago also agreed to sell the agent one kilogram of cocaine for \$26,000. There was general discussion as to the method for concluding the transaction, though no agreement was arrived at.
  - B. Claimant's contentions
- 1. Claimant denies that he agreed to sell any narcotics during a visit to Arlene Carlton's apartment on June 7, 1974.

#### IV. List of Witnesses

- A. For plaintiff: Joseph P. Salvemini, Special Agent, United States Drug Enforcement Administration.
  - B. For Claimant: Ivan Santiago, Claimant.

    Human Pete Montenez

    V. Exhibits
  - A. Plaintiff's Exhibits:
- 1. Transcript of plea proceeding before the Honorable Constance Baker Motley, May 12, 1975.
  - B. Claimant's Exhibits: None.

#### VI. Issue to be tried

The only issue to be tried in this action is whether Santiago's use of the defendant vehicle to drive to and from Arlene Carlton's apartment on June 7, 1974,

considering what transpired there, constituted facilitation of the sale of a controlled substance within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4).

000

1975

Dated: New York, New York So CRAFRED: 10/7/75

Consented to:

58

PAUL J. CURRAN

United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York

Attorney for Plaintiff

By:

PETER C. SALERNO

Assistant United States Attorney

791-1979

MICHAEL P. DIRENZO Attorney for Claimant,

Ivan Santiago 15 Columbus Circle

New York, New York 10023

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DEC 3 1 1975

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

S . . . 4. A

Plaintiff's

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

ONE 1974 CADILLAC ELDORADO SEDAN, SERIAL NO. 6L47S4Q407966,

: 74 Civ. 4508 (E.W.)

Defendant.

Plaintiff, by its attorney, Thomas J. Cahill,
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York,
submits the following proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law:

#### Findings of Fact

- 1. On Thursday, June 6, 1974, Joseph P. Salvemini, a Special Agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, acting in an undercover capacity, was introduced by Arlene Carlton to Hiram "Pete" Montanez at Carlton's apartment, no. 19D, 305 East 24th Street, New York, New York.
- 2. Agent Salvemini wished to purchase drugs, and specifically cocaine, as part of a criminal investigation. He and Montanez discussed the possibility of Montanez' selling cocaine to Salvemini, but Salvemini became angry when Montanez refused to discuss amounts larger than one-eighth of a kilogram.
- 3. Another meeting occurred on Friday, June 7, 1974, this time between Agent Salvemini, an informant, Montanez and Montanez' cousin, Ivan Santiago. At about 4:45 P.M., Agent Salvemini and the informant arrived at Arlene Carlton's apartment. At about 5:00 P.M. Montanez and Santiago arrived. Santiago was driving the defendant vehicle, and Montanez was his passenger. Santiago is also the registered owner of the defendant vehicle.

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- between Salvemini and Santiago, during which the two attempted to establish a business relationship to deal in cocaine. Santiago was the principal negotiator on the seller's side, and held himself out as the principal supplier and person in charge of the operation as well. Santiago was then prepared to sell Salvemini a kilogram of cocaine for \$26,000, and stated that he was prepared to sell substantially more as soon as an anticipated shipment of some 50 kilograms arrived. Santiago and Salvemini were not, however, then able to agree on the mechanics of concluding the transaction, and the meeting broke up at about 5:25 P.M., inconclusively on that point. Santiago and Montanez left the area in the defendant vehicle.
- 5. As a result of the aforementioned meeting, Salvemini met with Montanez at a restaurant called the Library, at Broadway and 92nd Street, New York, New York, on Monday, June 10, 1974, and after some discussion, agreed to purchase one-eighth of a kilogram of cocaine for \$4,000. That evening, at Carlton's apartment, Montanez delivered the cocaine to Salvemini.
- 6. The next day, June 11, 1974, Montanez and Salvemini again met at the Library and Montanez agreed to sell Salvemini a kilogram of cocaine. In the evening of that day, Montanez left Santiago's apartment at 675 Walton Avenue, Bronx, New York, entered an automobile, and began driving downtown to consummate the sale to Salvemini. On the way, Montanez was arrested and a kilogram of cocaine was found in the car he was driving.
- 7. Later that evening, Santiago was arrested in front of his apartment building. The following day, pursuant to a search warrant, his apartment was searched and

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the following items were found:

- 1. 307 grams (gross weight) of cocaine in a clear plastic bag.
- 2. 38 grams (gross weight) of marihuana in a clear plastic bag.
- 3. 28.4 grams (gross weight) of cocaine wrapped in a one dollar bill.
- 4. 29.5 grams (gross weight) of cocaine contained in tin foil.
- 5. A quantity of cocaine in a large spoon.
- 6. A triple beam balance scale.
- 7. An electronic calculator.
- 8. Some handi-wrap bags.
- 9. \$2500 in \$100 bills, representing Official Advance Funds.
- 10. \$23,999 in bills.
  //- \$ / \nabla 98.

  12. 896.5 grams (gross weight) of cocaine contained in two plastic bags inside a brown paper bag.
- 13. Two false-bottomed suitcases containing cocaine residue.
- 14. Eleven .38 caliber bullets.
- 8. The defendant vehicle was seized by Agent Salvemini at Dick Gidrom Cadillac, Inc., 696 East Fordham Road, Bronx, New York on June 12, 1974, because of its use in transporting Santiago and Montanez to the June 7 meeting. The vehicle was transported to the DEA garage in Manhattan.
- 9. Santiago was subsequently indicted, and on May 12, 1975 he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy

24 The June 7, 1974 meeting in Carlton's to traffic in cocaine. apartment, to which Santiago drove the defendant vehicle, was set forth in the indictment as an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 10. The June 7, 1974 meeting in Carlton's apartment, and the use of the defendant vehicle to transport Santiago and Montanez to it was intended by Santiago and Montanez to further their narcotics trafficking business, and the use of the vehicle thereby facilitated the sale of a controlled substance within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 881. Conclusions of Law This Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1345, 1355 and 21 U.S.C. § 881. 2. Venue is properly in the Southern District of New York by virtue of the defendant vehicle's seizure and storage within this District. 3. At the time the vehicle was seized, the seizing agents had probable cause to believe that the vehicle had been used to facilitate the sale of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §881(a)(4). 4. Santiago's use of defendant vehicle to transport himself and Montanez to Carlton's apartment on June 7, 1974, where negotiations took place regarding the sale of substantial quantities of cocaine, constituted facilitation of the sale of a controlled substance, to wit, cocaine.

5. By reason of the foregoing, the defendant vehicle is subject to forfeiture to the United States pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(4).

Dated: New York, New York

November 20, 1975

THOMAS J. CAHILL United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff

Ву:\_

PETER C. SALERNO
Assistant United States Attorney
United States Courthouse Annex

One St. Andrew's Plaza
New York, New York 10007
Telephone: (212) 791-1979

TO: MICHAEL P. DIRENZO, ESQ.
Attorney for Claimant Ivan Santiago
15 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10023

So ORDENED: 11/24/7.

PCS:emw 74-2558 d-114

A 26

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Plaintiff,

ORDER & JUDGMENT

74 Civ. 4508 (EW)

ONE 1974 CADILLAC ELDORADO SEDAN. SERIAL NO. 6L47S4Q407966,

Defendant.

The verified complaint in this action having been filed on October 15, 1974, demanding forfeiture of the defendant vehicle to the United States of America on the ground that it was allegedly used to facilitate the sale of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 881, and Ivan Santiago, the registered owner of the vehicle, having filed an answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and demanding judgment dismissing the complaint, and this action having come to trial before this Court on December 1, 1975, and this Court having filed its opinion on December 30, 1975, denying the requested decree of forfeiture and determining that the defendant vehicle should be released to Ivan Santiago, the claimant, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that forfeiture is denied, the complaint is dismissed, and the United States of America is directed to release the vehicle to the claimant, without prejudice to any claims that may be asserted against the vehicle by the Internal Revenue Service for taxes assessed against Ivan Santiago.

Dated: New York, New York

Judgment entered this 4 12 day of march, 1976.

27 1 Th:mg 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 5 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 74 Civil 4508 6 v. 7 ONE 1974 CADILLAC ELDORADO SEDAN s/n 6L47S4Q407966, 8 Defendant. 9 10 Before: 11 HON. EDWARD WEINFELD, 12 District Judge 13 New York, New York December 1, 1975 14 10:15 a.m. 15 APPEARANCES: 16 THOMAS J. CAHILL, Esq., United States Attorney 17 Southern District of New York PETER C. SALERNO, Esq., 18 Assistant United States Attorney 19 MICHAEL P. Di RENZO, Esq., Attorney for Defendant 20 21 22 23 24

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MR. SALERNO: Our Clerk's Office, your Honor, submitted two copies of the marked pleadings to your Honor's chambers last Monday.

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THE COURT: All you submitted was the complaint without the defendant's answer.

answer.

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MR. SALERNO: I didn't submit the defendant's answer, your Honor. I am sorry. I understood that that would be the defendant's obligation to submit a marked

Where is a copy of the defendant's answer?

THE COURT: Then you have not followed the rules.

I think you ought to to learn the rules. The plaintiff is the one supposed to submit marked pleadings. That includes all pleadings, even though of the opposing side.

MR. SALERNO: I am sorry, your Honor. I consulted my office and I got the impression from my people who told me that it was only the marked complaint that was necessary.

THE COURT: Where is your brief?

MR. DiRENZO: I just submitted it.

THE COURT: That's your brief?

MR. DiRENZO: My memorandum of law, your Honor.

THE COURT: Where is your memorandum of law?

MR. DiRENZO: I just submitted it to your Honor.

It is before your Honor now.

THE COURT: This is the plaintiff's trial memorandum.

MR. DiRENZO: Trial memorandum.

THE COURT: I don't see any defendant's --

MR. DiRENZO: May I see it, please? I am sorry,

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I gave you the wrong one by mistake.

THE COURT: You are supposed to get that in in advance, you know, Mr. DiRenzo.

MR. DiRENZO: I worked on it through Wednesday night, but Thursday being a holiday -- I understand you were not working on Friday -- I submitted it today.

THE COURT: All right.

Are you ready to proceed?

MR. SALERNO: Your Honor, there is one other typographical error I just found out, also on Friday, in our proposed findings and conclusions. It is a small point -that in the middle of page 3, in the list of items found as a result of a search, there should be an item 11 between between items 10 and 12, \$129.98 in coins. That would be item 11 of the list of things found in the search.

Your Honor, will it be necessary to have opening statements in this matter?

THE COURT: I have read your brief.

MR. SALERNO: At the outset--

THE COURT: Do you want to make an opening statement?

MR. DiRENZO: I am satisfied to make an opening statement, either way.

THE COURT: I have gone over the briefs, at

leas

least the Government's brief, and I suppose you rely on other cases, particularly the case up in, where is it,

Maine?

MR. DiRENZO: There are several cases, your Honor. Basically our contention is that the automobile was not used by prearrangement, and, secondly, that the vehicle itself was merely used for the accommodation or convenience of the defendant or the claimant, as we would call him here, in going to premises 324, I think it is, Fast 34th Street.

The entire meeting at that place took approximately 20 or 25 minutes.

The automobile that was used by the defendant was merely used at that time because the vehicle of a codefendant in that case had already been parked, and the defendant had not intended to meet the co-defendant on that particular date.

when he came there, there was no parking facility, and he parked his vehicle near the store that he was then occupying. It was at that point that the co-defendant advised him that they were going to this particular place. It was under those circumstances that he took the vehicle.

Secondly, additionally, we maintain that at the particular meeting which I believe is June 7, where he met --

defendant.

among the parties had been reached. As a matter of fact,

I think some of the Government's exhibits will establish

that there was no meeting of the minds at that point and

the defendant in words or substance said, "Either the deal

Some days later a sale is consummated with a co-

is off" or "You do it my way or we do nothing at all."

The only instance in which any reference is made to the vehicle is the reference to the date on which they went to the premises of a co-conspirator and a co-defendant where a meeting took place among the agent, the defendant Montanez, and the defendant Santiago.

We claim that under those circumstances the facilitation was, (1) a necessary ingredient that would come within the purview of the statute, making facilitation the type of facilitation that was contemplated by Congress in the enactment of this particular statute.

I have pointed out in my memorandum that in the cases that the Government relies upon, primarily the one decided by Judge Rifkind back a number of years ago, and in the cases decided by Judge Libell, that they go out of their way to go to the dictionary and to obtain a true meaning of the word "facilitate."

I know your Honor is familiar with all of the

translations given there, to make it a little easier for a

defendant. But there is one thing that they seem to over
look.

As I read the statute, and I read the word "facili-

As I read the statute, and I read the word "facili-tate" --

THE COURT: You know, this is supposed to be an opening statement. You are arguing the law, aren't you?

MR. DiRENZO: I am sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: As long as you got into it, you say that no agreement was reached on June 7.

How do you answer the Government's position that the defendant himself, when he pled guilty, he was asked:

"I would ask him if he agreed with Hiram Montanez to sell cocaine to certain individuals, whether he met with Hiram Montanez and other individuals in Arlene Carlton's apartment on or about June 7, and then negotiated for a sale of cocaine that Hiram Montanez eventually made the next day."

The next day is wrong, in any event. That is clear. The sale didn't take place until three days later, isn't that correct?

MR. SALERNO: That is correct, your Honor.

MR. DiRENZO: My answer to that question is very simple, your Honor.

THE COURT: What's the simple answer?

MR. DiRENZO: I don't know whether the Court is going to like to hear it, but the fact of the matter is that he was pleading guilty to a conspiracy, and your Honor well knows that if he didn't make an affirmative answer to the questions that were put to him by the United States Attorneys, which questions would definitely anticipate an affirmative answer, as well as the questions that were put by the Court, the Court never would have accepted the plea. It was convenient under those circumstances.

We run into this problem every day in the week.

Of course, we don't find it too often in the federal courts

because there is not as much-- there hasn't been up to this

point too many bargaining pleas and the Court and the United

States Attorney or the prosecuting attorney wants to make

sure that there will not be a 2255 application subsequently

or there won't be a coram nobis proceeding in the state

court.

If you look at one of the Government's exhibits, in his own memo, when he refers to the date on which this vehicle was used--

THE COURT: He states there was an inconclusive negotiation.

MR. DiRENZO: That is somewhat meaningful to me.

given by the defendant than his own plea. The fact of the matter is it was inconclusive by the Government's own statement and by their own reports which we received in connection with the suppression hearing. Even then there was mention that the deal was inconclusive on the negotiations at that point.

The answer we can give, and it is a truthful answer, as far as I am concerned, the defendant was told beforehand that unless he gave the answers that he gave, the Court would not accept the plea. It is that simple.

THE COURT: You are not taking the position, though, that he wasn't guilty of the conspiracy?

MR. DiRENZO: I am not taking that position.

THE COURT: You are referring specifically to that item as an overt act. Does the Government want to be heard at this point?

MR. SALERNO: No, your Honor, except to say that the evidence we think will prove that the inconclusiveness was solely on the method of transferring the drugs and the transfer of the drugs. I think that's what our papers say.

We claim the claimant in this transaction was ready and willing to do business right there and the --

Salvemini-direct

THE COURT: All right, you both have made statements. The statements of the lawyers are not evidence.

Let's take evidence.

MR. SALERNO: First I'd like to produce a certified copy of the indictment in this matter and the judgment of conviction.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is the indictment of Santiago and Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 is the judgment of conviction.

MR DiRENZO: No objection.

(Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2 received in evidence)

MR. SALERNO: The Government calls Joseph P. Salvemini.

JOSEPH P. SALVEMINI, called as a witness by the Government, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:

DIRFCT EXAMINATION

BY MR. SALERNO:

Q Mr. Salvemini, how are you employed?

A I am employed by the United States Department of Justice as a group supervisor for the New York Joint Task Force.

Q Joint Task Force of what agency?

Q Would you state the time of day that you met
Mr. Santiago on that day?

A I think it was approximately 4:45, 5:00 o'clock, around there.

Q Would you describe the circumstances leading up to that event?

A Yes, sir. I had been negotiating with Arlene
Carlton for a while relative to some purchases of methamphetamine and some purchase of cocaine.

On the day before that, about 1:30 in the afternoon, she introduced me to an individual by the name of Pete, whom we subsequently identified as Hiram Montanez.

Mr. Montanez and I met in Arlene Carlton's apartment and we negotiated for my purchasing a quantity of cocaine.

MR. DiRENZO: Objection, if your Honor pleases.

THE COURT: On what ground do you object?

MR. DiRENZO: The reason for the objection, surely it is a conclusion. He says he negotiated. We don't
know what he means--

THE COURT: State what was said on that occasion.

THE WITNESS: Arlene Carlton--

MR. DiRENZO: Of course I ask that it be taken subject to connection.

Salvemini-direct

THE WITNESS: Arlene Carlton introduced me to Hiram Montanez as Pete. She introduced me to him as Joe.

I said I understood he had some cocaine to sell, and he said, "Yes," that he and his cousin Ivan had brought 15 kilos of cocaine in from South America and that they had about three kilograms left.

At that time he told me he would sell me an eighth of a kilogram of cocaine.

I told him that he sounded like a rip-off artist, that I thought he was bull-shitting, because nobody who brought 15 kilos of cocaine in would be dealing in an eighth of a kilo.

He told me that the reason he and his cousin were only interested in selling an eighth was that they only had three kilos left and they had a lot of other customers they still had to take care of, and the reason the quantity was so small for myself was that I was a relatively new customer.

This trend of conversation continued back and forth and got quite heated. In fact, it became an argument, and I told him I thought he was trying to rip me off and he better come up with a better story than that.

Eventually I told Arlene Carlton to throw the guy out of the door, and she showed him out.

We prearranged something with Jerry Gile who was with me and he went down with Montanez into the street in order for the surveillance agents to identify him because up to that point we didn't know who he was.

- Q Could you state for the record what date this was?
  - A June 6, 1974.
  - Q What happened then?

A After some additional conversation with Arlene

Carlton --Montanez and Jerry Gile had left the apartment-Jerry

Gile came back up to the apartment - I had some additional

conversation with Arlene Carlton during which I discussed

what had just taken place and she told me that --

THE COURT: Wasn't she present when you had the conversation?

THE WITNESS: Yes. 'I am talking about subsequent to Mr. Montanez leaving the apartment. I had an additional conversation with Arlene Carlton relative to the circumstances.

MR. DiRENZO: That's objected to, if your Honor please.

THE COURT: Taken subject to connection.

THE WITNESS: She told me to do whatever I felt was best as far as the situation was concerned, she couldn't.

vouch for the guy that had just been up in the apartment at all, and ultimately Jerry Gile and myself left the apartment.

Q What happened then?

A We returned the next day, approximately a quarter to five in the evening, myself and Jerry Gile, and at about ten minutes later, or so, 15 minutes later, Pete, Hiram Montanez, arrived with Ivan Santiago, and he introduced—no one there apparently had ever met Ivan Santiago before—I know I had not, and he introduced Ivan Santiago around to the rest of us.

Q Will you tell the Court what prompted you to go back to the apartment --

A I meeting a phone call from Jerry Gile stating that he had been in touch with Hiram Montanez and that a meeting had been set up for that afternoon.

MR. DiRENZO: This is also taken subject to connection.

THE COURT: Subject to connection.

Q Then will you describe what you did on the 7th after you went to Arlene Carlton's apartment and what happened there?

A Yes. I guess we were there about 15 minutes during which I had some conversation with Arlene Carlton and

she stated again for me to do whatever I felt was best in

3 situation.

Mr. Montanez and Mr. Santiago arrived. At that time, Pete, Hiram Montanez, introduced me to Ivan Santiago. He introduced him as his cousin Ivan, and he introduced me as Joe to him.

We sat down in the living room and had a conversation. At that time Ivan Santiago told me that he was there to straighten out the disagreement between myself and Pete, and at that time I voiced my objections to doing only an eighth of a kilogram.

I told him that I didn't deal in eighths, that it was too small a quantity.

At that time he stated that he would deal me a kilogram of cocaine, and he set the price at \$26,000.

We then entered into a discussion about how the transaction was going to go down. I wanted it to go down using two rented cars, to put the money in one rented car and for him to put the cocaine, the kilo of cocaine, in the other rented car, and he vehemently objected to that.

He told me that he had been dealing in cocaine for six years and that in his experience it has to be a natural thing.

I remember specifically he said, "I might walk up

to you in front of a whole crowd of people at Christmas time with a Christmas package in my hand and there will be a kilo of cocaine in it, people will be all around and no one will know what's going on."

He reiterated the conversation I had with Pete the night before, the day before. He told me that he had brought in 15 kilos and they were going back for 50 kilos of cocaine in about a month.

He told me once the 50 kilos of cocains came back into the country, there would be no problem in my obtaining any quantity that I wanted but for the time being I would have to be satisfied with just that one kilo of cocaine.

and people that he knew, and most of this convesation, 95% of it, was between myself and Mr. Santiago, except for this point when Hiram Montanez interjected and said, "I want you to understand what's going on here. The reason he is asking you these questions is because he is trying to find somebody that the two of you know, or a place that the two of you hang out together at, in order to verify your story that you are who you say you are and he is who he says he is."

The conversation continued and he stated that the only acceptable method of doing the transaction would be to

do it indoors. He wasn't particular about where indoors, it just had to be done indoors.

Ultimately he asked Arlene Carlton if it would be acceptable that we utilize her apartment to conduct the transaction, and she said she didn't object to it.

After some additional discussion along these lines, we agreed -- they agreed, Ivan Santiago and Hiram Montanez agreed to consider my proposel for doing the kilogram deal in two rented cars, and I agreed to consider their proposal as far as doing it indoors, and we agreed to be back in touch at a later date.

Q Did either Ivan or Pete at that time say anything in substance and effect like "No deal" or "There is no deal" or "Forget about it"?

A Absolutely not. The only question that remained to be decided, the price had been decided, the quantity of the kilogram had been decided -- the only question that remained to be decided was whether we would do it my way utilizing two rented cars, whether we would do it their way, in an apartment, Arlene Carlton's apartment.

Q Do you recall the time that Ivan and Pete left?

A I would say it was about a half an hour after they arrived, which would probably be about maybe 25 minutes after five in the aftermoon.

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Q Do you recall whether Ivan and Pete left the apartment separately or together?

A Yes, I am absolutely sure they left together.

We shook hands all around, the two of them got up and left together. I recall remaining in the apartment a short time with Jerry Gile and Arlene Carlton alone.

Q During this conversation did you speak more with one person than with another person?

A Yes, sir, absolutely. I would say almost exclusively the conversation was with Ivan Santiago.

Q What happened after Ivan and Pete left the June 7th meeting?

A I had a conversation with Jerry Gile that Saturday -that was a Friday afternoon we are talking about - I had a conversation with Jerry Gile that Saturday, and I instructed him to arrange for a meeting at The Library Restaurant on Broadway and I believe 94th Street for that Monday, around noon.

? Then what happened?

A Subsequently, that Monday, which was June 10, 1974, I went to The Library at around twelve noon and a few minutes after Jerry Gile and I got there, Hiram Montanez arrived.

MR. DiRENZO: This is objected to, if your

Honor please, on the basis of the objection that is predicated on the fact that the only meeting, as I understand it, relative to this forfeiture proceeding, is the key date June 7, 1974.

I think it is beyond the purview of the complaint.

THE COURT: I will take it for the purpose of permitting the Government to establish whether or not the claimant Ivan Santiago was engaged in a conspiracy with the other named persons to effect a narcotics transaction in violation of the law.

Q Would you describe what happened at that meeting, please?

A Yes, sir. I had a conversation with Hiram
Montanez in which he told me that he had been in further
discussion with his cousin Ivan and that he and his cousin
Ivan were both still adamant about not wanting to conduct
the transaction out in the street, that it had to be done
indoors.

He gave me another counterproposal. He said that he would have his girl friend Cathy give the package of cocaine, the kilo of cocaine, to my girl friend in a ladies' room, and I would be sitting with him in a theatre, and that I would give him only half the money and that I could come come back the next day if I liked the cocaine and pay him the

other half of the money.

I decided after some additional discussion that there was no way I was going to convince him to do it out in the street, so I previously received permission from my supervisors to purchase an eighth of cocaine.

I proposed that to Hiram Montanez. I said, "Look, as I see it, the problem between us is that I don't trust you and you don't trust me. Why don't we do what you said at first? Let's do a quick eighth tonight; if 't goes down, OK, I will take a kilogram from you tomorrow."

He said, "Look, it is up to you. If you want the kilo tonight, you take the kilo tonight. It's no problem. If you want the eighth, take the eighth. It is completely up to you."

I agreed to purchase an eighth of cocaine that night at approximately eight o'clock in the evening.

Jerry Gile went and called Arlene Carlton and advised her that in fact her apartment would be utilized for the transaction and Hiram Montanezleft the area and I left the area.

We met again that night at approximately 20 minutes to eight in front of Arlene Carlton's apartment. At that time he had a blue tennis racket cover, a tennis racket with blue cover and a can of tennis balls in his

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when we met, myself, Jerry Gile and Hiram Montanez.

We went up to Carlton's apartment and when we got

We went upstairs, myself, Jerry Gile was with me

it was an eighth of a kilogram of white powder-
MR. DiRENZO: When you say "the defendant" --

up to Arlene's apartment, the defendant took the cocaine,

THE WITNESS: I am sorry, Hiram Montanez.

A (continuing) -- took an eigth of a kilogram of cocaine out of the tennis racket cover. He gave it to me. I checked the cocaine out up in the apartment and I paid him \$4,000 in Government funds.

This was a price that had previously been arranged at The Library.

I then told him that I would meet him at the same time at The Library he next day in order to discuss the purchase of a kilogram, if everything was OK with the eighth that I had purchased.

I left the apartment at approximately I guess five minutes after eight that night.

O Did you do anything the next day?

A Yes, I went back to The Library at twelve noon and I met with Hiram Montanez. At that time I told him that I would take the kilogram of cocaine; again the insistence was that it be done in the apartment.

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I agreed to this transaction and that was essentially it.

He reiterated the fact that he and Ivan were going back very shortly to South America for approximately 50 kilos of cocaine and that if this kilogram went down without a hitch in it, that there would be no problem in my obtaining any quantity of cocaine I wanted.

- Q Then what happened?
- A I left. We shook hands and I left the area.

I then instructed my surveillance to maintain a surveillance of Ivan Santiago's apartment house, and they saw certain movements and maneuvers between Ivan Santiago and Hiram Montanez.

THE COURT: You were not present?

THE WITNESS: No.

MR. DiRENZO: That's objected to. Move to strike.

THE COURT: Objection sustained.

- Q Just tell us what you did that evening.
- A I went down to Arlene Carlton's apartment with the money. I waited for a signal from my surveillance on the street at that second location, which would indicate to me that in fact--

MR. DiLORENZO: That's objected to, your Honor.
THE COURT: I will let him state it.

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A Ivan Santiago and Hiram Montanez were placed under arrest. In fact, they were not coming to the apartment. When I was certain of that, I went up to the apartment. I threw it back on Arlene Carlton. I told her, "These people are not worth anything. See, I am here; they are not here."

I waited for about 15 minutes until a quarter after eight, and then I left.

THE COURT: Did you arrest her then, too?

THE WITNESS: No. The problem was that I was undercover in three different cases with intertwining defendants and I didn't want to burn myself. I stayed up there long enough to show that I was not involved in any arrest.

Of course, she got the word later on that there was an arrest but she could vouch for me being up in the apartment.

Q What did you do then?

A I maintained my undercover contacts with Arlene Carlton and Thomas Mattio and the other defendants in the cases. I did not have anything else to do with these defendants other than after they were removed from the defendant Ivan Santiago's apartment, I did secure the apartment and waited for a federal search warrant.

Q Was a search warrant subsequently executed in that apartment?

A Yes. Dan Pykett from the U.S. Attorney's Office prepared a search warrant for us and approximately two o'clock the following day we executed a search warrant on the premises.

THE COURT: That would be June 12?

THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor.

Q Did you participate in the execution of that search warrant?

A Yes, sir, I did.

MR. SALERNO: We would like to make an offer of proof as to what was recovered in that search warrant, and I understand that Mr. DiRenzo is prepared to stipulate as to what was recovered, but he objects to the relevancy.

So we will not present witnesses who will testify as to the chemical combinations that were found there.

Mr. DiRenzo I gather is prepared to stipulate as to the results of the search, though he objects, as I say, to the relevancy.

MR. DiRENZO: Basically that is true. I have stated to Mr. Salerno that I would object to the receipt or the introduction of the return on the search warrant on the ground that it would not be within the purview of the issues

involved in this particular complaint, but that if your Honor ruled against me on my objection, then it would not be necessary for him to call in a chemist or anybody else.

THE COURT: I will rule it is admissible to show the nature of the claimant's activities.

MR. SALERNO: I take it, your Honor, that the stipulation would be that the materials found were as set forth in Item 7 of our proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law or in the identical list at pages 6 and 7 of our trial memorandum, which is what Mr. DiRenzo and I discussed on the phone.

MR. DiRENZO: That is correct.

- Q Did you participate in the seizure of a vehicle in connection with this investigation?
  - A Yes, sir, I did.
  - Q What did you do in that respect?
- A On the 12th, I believe it was in the afternoon, myself and several other special agents proceeded to Dick Gidron, Cadillac dealership in the Eronx, and we seized a 1974 two-door red Eldorado.
- Q Do you recall the license --THE COURT: I don't follow. You proceeded to
  where?

THE WITNESS: The Cadillac dealership. Dick

I move that that part of the answer be stricken.

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THE COURT: Well, he had the discussion that he testified to earlier.

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We will take his answer as amended that way.

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MR. DiRENZO: If I err, I want to err on the side of caution.

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I want to get it absolutely clear, Mr. Salvemini. What were you told at or about the time that you

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seized the vehicle?

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I was fully aware that that Cadillac was the vehicle that Hiram Montanez and Ivan Santiago had utilized on the 7th and also the fact that immediately after the purchase of Exhibit No. 1 in this case, the eighth of a kilogram, when Hiram Montanez was followed back to Ivan Santiago's apartment, that that was the same vehicle that

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was in front of the apartment at the time.

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THE COURT: I don't follow that.

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(Record read)

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THE COURT: That wasn't the vehicle that Montanez went back from the restaurant in to the apartment where you met him, is it?

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THE WITNESS: No. The vehicle was in front of Ivan Santiago's apartment on that date again.

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THE COURT: It was in front of the building, parked there?

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2	THE WITNESS: Right.
3	Q Did you see it there, Mr. Salvemini?
4	A No. I was aware that it was there. I did not see
5	it.
6	MR. DiRENZO: Then I move the answer be stricken.
7	THE COURT: The answer is stricken, but even ac-
8	cepting his statement, I just want to make sure I under-
9	stood: That vehicle was not used again in connection with the
10	transaction?
11	THE WITNESS: No. Not to my knowledge.
12	THE COURT: The only time it was used was on June
13	7th?
14	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
15	THE COURT: In order to transport both Montanez
16	and Santiago to the East 24th Street address?
17	THE WITNESS: Yes.
18	THE COURT: Where they left the car and then went
19	up into the apartment?
20	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
21	THE COURT: And presumably they left again and
22	drove away in the car?
23	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
24	Q Once more, because I am not certain that I ever

got an answer to this: How did you know at the time you

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2	seized	the vehicle that the vehicle had been used on June
3	7th in	the way that you described?
	А	It was the same plate number, the same exact
5	car we	had seen.
.	0	Did you personally see the webigle on the 7th?

- Did you personally see the vehicle on the 7th?
- Special Agent O'Connor is the one that saw the vehicle.
  - So how did you find out that that was the vehicle?
- I was informed. I was the acting group supervisor at the time.

MR. DiRENZO: Then I move --

THE COURT: The answer is stricken.

MR. SALERNO: The reason we are offering that is because it goes to the probable cause which under the statute is required for the seizure of the vehicle.

I think the probable cause allows the hearsay.

THE COURT: Is there any issue, though, as to whether or not the vehicle did convey the claimant Ivan Santiago and Hiram Montanez to the East 24th Street premises on June 7th?

MR. DiRENZO: There is no question.

THE COURT: Then what is the problem?

MR. SALERNO: I wanted to establish for the Court that at the time Mr. Salvemini seized the vehicle, he knew

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Salvemini-direct

that, that's all. That's all I was trying to get at.

THE COURT: You can bring another witness to establish it, so it does not make any difference, really, does it?

MR. DiRENZO: I think under the circumstances he is not qualified to testify to that, and that was obvious from the answer that he gave, thathe was informed by someone.

THE COURT: On probable cause he can act on hear-say, can he not, under the cases?

MR. DiRENZO: That might well be.

THE COURT: We will take his statement.

MR. SALERNO: It is only offered, your Honor, to show probable cause, not to show the merits of the issue.

Q In your work as a Drug Enforcement Agent, have you operated undercover at times other than in this investigation?

- A Yes, sir.
- Q What proportion of your work has been undercover?
- A I'd say the vast majority of my work over the last seven and a half years has been undercover.
- Q Have you purchased illegal drugs in an undercover capacity in these investigations?

2	A	Yes,	on	several	hundred	occasions

A Yes.

Q In this work, have you observed the people you deal with using automobiles?

Did you say several hundred?

A Yes, I have.

Q About how often?

A Almost all the time. I would say 95% of the time they utilize a vehicle.

MR. DiRENZO: I object to this line of question-

THE COURT: I sustain the objection.

We are concerned here in this case with whether or not this vehicle was used to facilitate the sale in question, and the fact that in this illicit business automobiles are used does not establish the evidentiary support for the use of a vehicle to facilitate the transaction that is at issue.

MR. SALERNO: That does not, your Honor --

THE COURT: I am going to rule that way particularly in the light of this witness' testimony that the proposal was by him to effect the transaction through the means of two rented cars or to conclude the transaction in an apartment.

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lh:mg

## Salvemini-direct

MR. SALERNO: That is correct, your Honor, but I think I am trying to establish through the testimony that there may be particular ways in which particular kinds of vehicles will be used in narcotics transactions.

I think I have established that he may have some expertise in that matter, and I think what his testimony might do is justify an inference that the use of this particular kind of vehicle for this particular purpose as opposed to transportation of actual illegal drugs might have been intended by the people for a particular purpose related to the narcotics business.

THE COURT: I am sorry, I don't follow that statement.

You better clarify that.

MR. SALERNO: I hesitate to offer proof in the presence of the witness, your Honor. I don't want to prompt the witness.

May we perhaps have a side bar conference on this?

THE COURT: All right. I will hear you in the robing room.

(In the robing room)

MR. SALERNO: Your Honor, it is simply this, that his observation has been that frequently a flashy car, such

as is involved here, might be used by the top man in any narcotics conspiracy as a show to the people he is dealing with, whereas in the actual transaction, which might be done first of all through underlings, and second of all, using cheaper cars, precisely in part because of the forfeiture provisions, and also because the flashy car sometimes lends credibility to what the seller in this case is proposing; namely, it lends credibility --

THE COURT: Yes, but this theory has to yield to the evidence. According to this witness' testimony, he was in the apartment. How could he have been influenced by a flashy car?

MR. SALERNO: Because there is no knowledge on Santiago's part when he came there that the witness would not go down there. The witness could have gone --

THE COURT: That is so farfetched, please, let's stick to evidence. He could have. Did he look out the window?

MR. SALERNO: No, he did not.

THE COURT: Why are we spending time on anything like that?

MR. SALERNO: I will drop that, your Honor.

I thought it was relevant.

THE COURT: I don't, with due respect.

11	A 61
1	lh:mg Salvemini-direct/cross 35
2	(In open court)
3	THE COURT: You may continue your questioning.
4	MR. SALERNO: No further questions of this wit-
5	ness.
6	CROSS-EXAMINATION
7	BY MR. DIRENZO:
8	Q Mr. Salvemini, on June 7, 1974, did you personally
9	see thevehicle that's the subect of this particular transac-
0	tion?
.1	A No, sir, I did not.
2	Q With reference to the conversation that you say
.3	you had with with Mr. Santiago on June 7, did there come a
4	time when Mr. Santiago told you that he was not interested i
15	the manner in which you wanted to negotiate this deal?
16	A That's absolutely incorrect, sir. He agreed
17	to consider my proposals and I agreed to consider his, rela-
18	tive to the method of conducting the transaction.
19	Q There was talk about two vehicles being used,
20	rented vehicles, is that correct?
21	A There was talk about several methods of conducting
22	the transaction, yes, sir.
23	Q He didn't agree with the method you suggested, is
24	that correct?
25	A No, sir, he did not.

Salvemini-cross

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Q He did not agree?

A That is correct.

Q When he left the apartment at which you and he and Montanez were having this conversation, at that point you still had not agreed --

A Well, sir, we had agreed to price and we had agreed to quantity, but what we had not agreed to was whether we were going to use Arlene Carlton's apartment or two rented cars.

Q When you say you agreed, aren't you saying that there was a discussion?

A No, sir.

Q One minute, please.

There was a discussion about the price of a kilo being \$26,000, is that correct?

A No, sir, that's incorrect. When I arrived at the apartment and when he arrived at the apartment, the argument was an eighth of a kilogram or no deal.

When we left the apartment, the deal was \$26,000 for a kilogram with the method to be decided subsequently.

Q Is it your contention that at the point where he left the apartment that you had a definite conclusive arrangement or a meeting of the minds as to what you were going to do in connection with his meeting there that day,

June 7th?

- A I am afraid I don't understand the question.

  THE COURT: Reframe your question.
- Q What arrangement do you say was made between you and Santiago on June 7? What was agreed upon between you?

A I was to purchase a kilogram of cocaine for \$26,000 with the physical method of conducting the transaction to be decided at a later date.

Q So that it is your testimony that on June 7, in words or substance, he stated to you, "I will meet you at some later date and at that time I will supply you with a kilo for \$26,000, provided you do things the way I want you to do them"?

A Sir, those are your words, Not his. I believe
I have already testified as to exactly what he said.

Q Tell me again. What exactly did he say?

\$26,000, but that's all I will be able to sell you until I bring the 50 kilograms in. Once I bring the 50 kilograms in, you can have all you want. I don't want to deal in a car on the street. I want it to be a natural thing." And he used as an example a Christmas package, a gaily wrapped Christmas gift with a kilo of cocaine in it which he could hand to me in front of many people and no one would be the

Salvemini-cross

wiser.

Immediately prior to his leaving the apartment,

Counselor, he stated to me that he would consider my proposal of utilizing two rental cars and I agreed to consider his proposal, and we agreed to meet at a time in the not too distant future and conduct the transaction, which was to be for one kilogram of cocaine.

- Q Did you ever meet him?
- A I never met him again, no, sir.
- Q Although you said you would meet?
- A He didn't say I would meet him.
- Q Didn't I understand you to state a moment ago, in answer to a question that was just put to you, that there was going to be another meeting between you? Wasn't that your language?
- A Counselor, it was quite clear, and I am sorry if I didn't bring this out, that any physical transfer would take place between myself and Hiram Montanez.
- Q It was quite clear in your mind? That's what you are saying.
  - A No one asked me the question.
  - Q I am asking you.
  - A I am telling you.
  - Q What are you telling me?

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That it was quite clear between myself and Ivan Santiago that he would physically not touch the cocaine.

- Did he ever say that to you?
- Yes, he did.
- He said that? You didn't testify to that on direct examination, did you?
  - Do you want me to go into the details?
- No. I just asked you. You didn't testify to that on direct examination.
  - A No one asked me the question, Counselor.
- You didn't testify to that before Judge Motley in the suppression hearing.
- I never testified before Judge Motley in the suppression hearing at all, Counselor, so it would be quite impossible for me to testify to that.
- Q One thing is certain, by your testimony, he said nothing would transpire in the car? Did you give us that answer a moment ago?
- A He did not want to conduct the transaction in the street, as I wanted to do. He wanted to conduct the transaction in an apartment. There was never any specific discussion about the car other than the cars I mentioned, Counselor.

THE COURT: The cars you mentioned, as I understood

the transaction you say you had with him on June 7, is that

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## your testimony?

No, it is not. You said to my knowledge no one had spoken to him, and that's increes.

Relative to this case, to my killedge, no one ever did speak to him again.

- That's what we are talking about, this case.
- You made ageneral statement, Counselor. Then you scream at me if I didn't answer correctly.
  - I didn't mean to scream at you.
  - That makes me feel a little better.
  - I could see it. 0

This conversation took place with Mr. Santiago on the 7th?

- That is correct.
- Q When did you next have a conversation with Mr. Montanez?

A On the morning -- well, twelve noon of the 10th of that year, that month.

- That's some three days later, is that correct?
- A Yes. That was a Friday afternoon. That would be a Monday morning.
- On that occasion you met with Mr. Montanez, correct?
  - That is correct.

3			Salvemini-cross			
Q	You	didn't	meet	with	Santiago?	

- A Absolutely not.
- Q You didn't see Montanez in Santiago's vehicle, the subject of this transaction, this particular case?

A I never saw that vehicle until the morning-- the afternoon I seized it.

- Q By the way, do you know the plate number of it?
- A Offhand I do not. It is in my report, Counselor.
- Q Incidentally, you say that Arlene Carlton participated in this conversation on the 7th?

A No, sir, I did not. She was present, she had very little to say. When you say participate, if you mean by being physically present and saying a word or two, then the answer is yes. If you mean did she actively participate in the negotiations with the two defendants, then the answer is no.

Q As a matter of fact, Carlton wenn't even in the room when you had this discussion, isn't that correct?

A She left for the vast majority of the discussion, right after the introduction—she came back when Ivan Santiago asked her about the utilization of the apartment, she was there for a couple of minutes before and after that, but for the vast majority she was not—she went in the bedroom.

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.	1h:mg Salvemini-cross 43
:	Q When you say Mr. Santiago asked her about the
3	utilization of her apartment, he asked her that question
•	in your presence?
5	A Yes, sir, that is correct.
3	Q Where did this conversation take place?

The conversation -- it is a one-bedroom apartment. A This took place in the living room by the window. There are two sofas, I believe, a chair and a coffee table. That is where we were seated.

Incidentally, this apartment that we are talking about, did she reside there, do you know?

Yes, that was her residence apartment.

Was she conducting a business there, to your knowledge?

Not in that apartment, no, sir.

Wasn't that a house of pleasure?

If you are talking about the apartment next door which was her place of business, that was a house of prostitution. Her apartment where we conducted the negotiations was her residence apartment. She had two apartments on the same floor.

- Was she Jerry's girl friend?
- No, not to my knowledge.
- But he had been going there --Q

1	lh:mg Salvemini-cross 44
2	THE COURT: Who is Jerry?
3	MR. DiRENZO: Jerry Gile.
4	Q Is that correct, the name?
5	THE WITNESS: That's the Jerry I was referring
6	to ,yes, your Honor.
7	Q He had been in that apartment on many, many oc-
8	casions, had he not, to your knowledge?
9	A Who, myself or him?
10	Q Jerry.
11	A Yes; to my knowledge, yes.
12	Q He was a customer there, wasn't he?
13	A Not to my knowledge.
14	Again, you are asking me to give hearsay testi-
15	mony. I would say absolutely not; without having been
16	physically present in the apartment to observe all the
17	activities, Counselor.
18	Q Do you know whether he had been there approxi-
19	mately about a year and a half before that time and kept
20	going back and forth almost every day?
21	A No, that's incorrect.
22	Q That's incorrect?
23	A Yes.
24	Q You know that of your own knowledge?

Counselor, unless I was physically present in that

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apartment for 365 days I would not know any of these answers of my own knowledge.

You are asking me for my opinion of my relationship and the informant's relationship with the individuals that frequented that apartment, and I am giving you my opinion.

Q But you were talking to Jerry right along?

A Again, you are asking me something -- I have no idea what Jerry Gile did when he was not physically in my presence.

Q Did you ask him if he was at that apartment?

A That's the answer I am giving you, Counselor.

You are telling me now it is a hearsay answer.

Q I am just asking --

A Jerry Gile went to that apartment very infrequently, Counselor, according to the statements he gave me, until the time we instituted a series of investigations, at which time he started going there more frequently, at my specific direction.

Q What specifically did you say to Mr. Santiago, if anything, about a rip-off?

A As I recall the conversation relative to the ripoff, the majority of it took place on the 6th of June, and that was with Hiram Montanez, and there was very little

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conversation relative to a rip-off. I indicated that I was afraid of a rip-off to Mr. Santiago, and he reassured me, and that's when we initiated the conversation about places I frequented and people I knew that he might possibly know, things like that, in order to reassure the two of us that we were both legitimate.

- You made a record, I take it, of this meeting that you had with Mr. Santiago and Mr. Montanez, correct?
  - There are BND 6 reports that included that.
- In those reports, I take it -- I say you did
- I take it in those reports you made some reference to the fact that this could possibly be a rip-off?
- No. Counselor, I told them that I was afraid A of a rip-off. I honestly didn't feel that it was a ripoff.
  - Q But did you put that in any of your reports?
  - Absolutely, Counselor. A
  - You did? Q
  - A Absolutely.
- When do you say that you had this conversation with Q Montanez; on June 6th?
  - Yes, Counselor, June 6; my report of the meeting

MR. DiRENZO: In the light of the answer given

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by this witness, I respectfully ask that all reports made by this witness be made available to counsel now so that I may examine them and peruse them.

THE COURT: Of course this is not a criminal case, as you know, and Section 3500 of Title 18 does not control, but nonetheless I will require that the reports be turned over. In fact, I thought you had possession of them in connection with your prior representation of the claimant in this case in the criminal prosecution.

MR. SALERNO: I will turn over, your Honor --

THE COURT: Aren't you going a bit afield now in your inquiry, Mr. DiRenzo?

MR. DiRENZO: I recognize that, your Honor, but the only purpose for which I am going into this particular area is solely on the question of credibility, that's all, your Honor. That's the only purpose for it.

THE COURT: What issue of credibility is there?

The car was there on June 7th. The only issue that you could possibly raise is at one point the Government said that at the conference or negotiation upstairs they reached no result.

The witness claims they did come to an arrangement at that time. The Government, to support it, relies upon the defendant's own plea when he was asked whether

he met with Hiram Montanez and other individuals in Arlene Carlton's apartment on or about June 7th and there negotiated the sale of cocaine that Hiram Montanez eventually made the next day.

The issue is very simple in this case. Even taking it at that point, on his own statement, the issue still remains whether or not the use of the car to transport two men to an apartment where there was discussion and a negotiation leading to the arrangement for a sale at the appropriate time is the facilitation— is facilitation within the meaning of the statute.

MR. DiRENZO: I am afraid I must agree with your Honor. I will not pursue the area.

Q At the meeting on the 7th, is it your testimony on direct examination that you objected to the purchase of the sale of a one-eighth kilo?

A Yes, sir, it is.

Q But Mr. Santiago said a kilo would be all right, not an eighth?

A He came around to my way of thinking. I told him I didn't deal in eighths. I told him a kilo would be the smallest I would do.

THE COURT: Incidentally, Mr. Witness, coming back to this statement that I just referred to that was made

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Salvemini-cross

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at the time of the entry of the plea, which I read a moment ago, the last part is that Hiram Montanez eventually made the next day, that is not correct, is it?

THE WITNESS: No, your Honor.

next day? It was three days later, on the 10th?

THE WITNESS: That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: That is a mistake, obviously?

THE WITNESS: That's right. There was a week-end, I believe.

THE COURT: I think you said June 7th was a Friday and on Monday you met him, Montanez, at The Library Restaurant?

THE WITNESS: That's correct.

THE COURT: No I have the sequence right? There
you negotiated for the sale of an eighth of a kilo which
you purchased that night, delivery was made at the apartment
of Arlene Carlton?

THE WITNESS: Yes. We did have discussion about the kilo there, but I still could not get them to go outside.

THE COURT: And the following day you were about to consummate the purchase of a kilo?

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apartment on the second floor?

Do you know now that your agents went to an

### Salvemini-cross

A No, sir, I don't. In any event, Mr. Santiago is the one that took them to the apartment. It was Apartment 4H.

Q He took them up to the apartment?

A Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, as I recall, he insisted that they search the apartment immediately. We were the ones that insisted on obtaining a federal search warrant.

Q Isn't it a fact that Mr. Santiago was kept in a government vehicle in front of those premises?

A Not to my knowledge, Counselor.

Q Isn't it a fact that he never went to the apartment?

A My understanding, Counselor, is that he accompanied the agents to the apartment; they entered the apartment. And then he was transported down to the office.

We recured the apartment and obtained a federal search warrant the following day.

Q When you say you "secured" the apartment, you mean your agents under your supervision did that?

A Actually it was better than that, Counselor.

I myself and two other agents remained overnight in the apartment until we obtained a federal search warrant from the United States Magistrate, and then we executed the warrant.

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1	lh:mg Salvemini-cross 54
2	Q Isn't that after you had taken the keys out of
3	his pocket while he was handcuffed and in a government
4	vehicle in front of 687 Walton Avenue?
5	THE COURT: Mr. DiRenzo, what does this have to
6	do with the case?
7	MR. DiRENZO: The only significant or proba-
8	tive value that it might have, your Honor, again, is on
9	the question of credibility, and I would most respectfully-
10	THE COURT: He wasn't present. He secured the
11	apartment.
12	MR. DiRENZO: They had him under surveillance.
13	His only connection with the apartment was, to use his
14	expression, to secure it, and he explained how he secured
15	it. He stayed there overnight.
16	Q That was after you had a written consent from
17	the defendant?
18	A As I understand it, we had a written consent to
19	search the apartment which we declined to utilize.
20	Q You subsequently got a search warrant predicated
21	on the consent?
22	A Yes. It was 10:30 that night. We could not get
23	one that night. We gotone the next day. Not predicated

on the consent, Counselor; predicated upon the fact that

upon entering the apartment in the search for any other

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individuals, there was cocaine and large sums of money in plain view. It was predicated on those facts.

- Q That was all testified to before Judge Motley?
- A I don't know. I wasn't there.
- Q I don't take it you ever read any of the statements in connection with it or the testimony that was offered by your own agents?
  - A No, sir, I did not.
  - Q Did you know the keys were taken from his pocket?
  - A Counselor, I wasn't there. I told you that.
  - Q I mean you don't know that to this day?
  - A Absolutely not.
- Q That consent was signed somewhere around 9:30, 10:00 o'clock at night?

A As far as I know, Counselor, I was advised of that consent approximately five o'clock or, no, excuse me, approximately nine o'clock or 9:30 in the evening. I advised my agents, I was the acting supervisor, I advised my agents not to execute the search, to look in the rooms, make sure there was nobody in those rooms, no other defendants, potential defendants or anyone else that could destroy any evidence in the premises, and to secure the premises.

I then went up there physically and myself I physically went up and took hold of the situation.

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We never exeucted the consent to search. We waited for the issuance of a federal search warrant.

Q And the consent was signed in the government vehicle, correct?

A Counselor --

THE COURT: He wasn't there. Why are we spending time on that, Mr. DiRenzo? The witness has repeatedly stated he was not present.

Q Incidentally, when this vehicle you say was seized, that was on June 12, is that correct?

A Yes, it is.

Q At that particular time the automobile was being serviced at a Cadillac agency?

A I believe they told us it had a broken power antenna.

Q In other words, it was being repaired?

A Yes.

Q Did you ascertain when that vehicle was brought in for repair?

A I didn't.

MR. DiRENZO: I have no further questions.

THE COURT: Any redirect?

MR. SALERNO: No redirect, your Honor.

THE COURT: The witness is excused.

(Witness excused)

MR. SALERNO: That concludes the Government's di-

MR. DiRENZO: At this time, your Honor, I would respectfully move to strike out all of that testimony that was taken subject to connection on the ground that it has not been connected.

THE COURT: Motion denied.

MR. DiRENZO: Respectfully except.

Now, if your Honor pleases, I move for judgment on the pleadings and on the testimony offered by this particular witness on the ground that the only evidence established here was that the vehicle in questionwas used for no other purpose or solely for the purpose to suit the convenience of the claimant in this case to reach a certain area.

It in no way constituted a facilitation within the meaning of the statute.

As I read the facilitation statute, and I don't know, the Courts have given strict interpretations or loose interpretations of the word "facilitate," they seem to skirt the question of facilitation.

As I read it, the facilitation should be in connection with the transportation, the concealment, and all of the other items that are contained in the statute.

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The facilitation should be in connection with each of the items set forth in the statute.

I submit that as one of the judges in the Tenth
Circuit decided, and I have it in my memo, that on that
particular ground, there is a serious question as to whether
constitutionally it is not indefinite and vague.

I submit as a matter of law that this case as it is presently presented to the Court does not .rise sufficiently in order to justify a forfeiture.

THE COURT: Mr. Salerno, what role do you contend the car played in facilitating this transaction? Precisely what was its function in furthering--

MR. SALERNO: Precisely, your Honor, it was used by Mr. Santiago, who is a substantial narcotics dealer, the testimony shows that, to transport himself and a confederate to a place where he clearly negotiated a sale with some terms open. He has pleaded guilty to a conspiracy--

THE COURT: You are saying, using it as a means of conveyance to a place where he discussed a narcotics transaction, that means it facilitated the transaction?

Suppose he walked there?

MR. SALERNO: Then there would be nothing to forfeit.

THE COURT: Might you not argue that his personal

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possessions on his person while he was walking were subject to forfeiture?

MR. SALERNO: No, your Honor, because the statute merely says-- provides that conveyances that facilitate --

THE COURT: Supposing he engaged a taxicab; would the taxi be subject to forfeiture?

MR. SALERNO: I think that might be subject to one of the two exceptions in the statute: either use without the knowledge of the owner -- there could be no intent obviously on the part of a cab driver to facilitate any kind of narcotics dealing, and if there were, it would be forfeitable. There is an exception for the common carrier for precisely that reason.

THE COURT: Assuming that the claimant here owns an airplane and he was based in Suffolk and flew into the heliport and left the airplane there and walked over to the apartment here; would the airplane be subject to forfeiture?

MR. SALERNO: That is beginning to get, your Honor, where we recognize that the nexus between the use of the vehicle and the actual illegal activity becomes somewhat remote. I am not quite sure --

THE COURT: Why is that more remote than driving an automobile as a means of conveyance?

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60 MR. SALERNO: Only because that got him just to the general area of Manhattan and he would have to use some other conveyance--THE COURT: Supposing the heliport were right adjacent to 24th Street. At one time there was one at 23rd Street, as a matter of fact.

MR. SALERNO: I think in that circumstance --You said it was the claimant's airplane in the hypothetical?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SALERNO: We believe it would be seizable.

THE COURT: One case you didn't discuss is United Staets. v. 1972 Datsun at 378 F. Sup. 1200.

MR. SALERNO: I believe I cited it although I admit I did not discuss it.

MR. DiRENZO: I believe I did.

THE COURT: I didn't see your brief until you walked into the courtroom. It would have been helpful if you had submitted it over the weekend.

MR. SALERNO: I may not have cited it, your Honor. I thought I had. I recognize that as a contrary case, though I think once again--

THE COURT: In that case Judge Bownes after reviewing various cases, came to the conclusion that to be

forfeited, a vehicle must have some substantial connection to or be instrumental in the commission of the underlying activity which the statute seeks to prevent.

MR. SALERNO: That is true, your Honor. I have two comments about that case.

One is that in a footnote I think it recognizes that the cases upon which we rely, principally the Pontiac case decided by Judge Libell in this District, stands for a somewhat broader rule.

Second of all, I think the case on its facts is clearly contrary to our case, as I recall the facts. I think to that extent it is a case which should not be followed in this District.

I think the use of the vehicle in this case was instrumental in that it was used according to--

THE COURT: The only use of it was the convenience of the claimat in going to 24th Street.

MR. SI. WO: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: There is no use of the car in any sense insofar as transporting the narcotics is concerned or using the car as a place of negotiation or as some of the cases put it, as a decoy.

MR. SALERNO: That is true.

THE COURT: The case really narrows down here on

the facts to the use of the car for the convenience of one

of the parties who is a conspirator.

MR. SALERNO: Or maybe both of the parties, your Honor.

THE COURT: Or both of them.

Is that sufficient to require forfeiture?

MR. SALERNO: As I say, I think convenience kind of begs the question. We submit that Santiago came to this meeting and his statement at the outset of the meeting was that he was there to straighten out the problem that Salvemini and Pete had had the previous day.

THE COURT: Instead of walking there, he used his car to get there. You say having used his car that that was a facilitation of the eventual sale?

MR. SALERNO: Yes, intending to make a trip that clearly furthered his narcotics business. He pleaded guilty to an indictment for conspiracy in which that meeting was admitted --

THE COURT: I am accepting that and disregarding your statement in the brief that the meeting-- what was the expression you used, was inconclusive.

MR. SALERNO: I think I meant inconclusive only on the point that Mr. Salvemini testified that it was inconclusive, your Honor.

THE COURT: I am trying to get this down to what I think is the basic question here. This was the sole use of the car. Three days later the transaction is consummated, the car plays no part in any other step in connection with that transaction.

MR. SALERNO: That is correct.

THE COURT: Actually the co-conspirator who consummated the transaction used another car when he made delivery.

In addition to that, there is the testimony in this case of the witness, now, that his proposal was to use two rented cars, which immediately excludes the car in question as being used to further the sale, or, alternatively, the conspirator's proposal that the transaction be consummated in an apartment.

MR. DiRENZO: Your Honor, there is one other point I would like to make, and that is that the plea taken by the defendant in this case was a plea to a conspiracy and not to sale, and I think that also is a very, very --

THE COURT: Except there is an overt act that he acknowledged at the time of the plea which admittedly is incorrect certainly in one very substantial respect, and that is the date of the delivery of the narcotics which he placed -- he didn't place it, the Assistant stated it took

Santiago-direct

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pl	ace	the	next	day,	and	he	agreed	that	was	so.

I will reserve decision on the motion.

MR. DiRENZO: Then I will put the defendant on.

IVAN SANTIAGO, called as a witness

in his own behalf, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:

#### DIRECT EXAMINATION

#### BY MR. DIRENZO:

- Q Mr. Santiago, you are the claimant in this action?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q You are also a named defendant in a case captioned United States District Court, Southern District of New York, designated United States of America v. Arlene Carlton, Ivan Santiago and Hiram Montanez, under Indictment No. 74 Cr. 623; is that correct?
  - A Yes, sir.
- Q Did there come a time when you had occasion to go to premises 304 East 24th Street, Borough of Manhattan, City and County of New York?
  - A Yes, sir.
- Q In connection with your visit to the apartment at those premises, when for the first time did you learn you were going to that particular apartment?
  - A I didn't know until earlier that afternoon.

is that right?

A Right.

- Q Subsequent to leaving that apartment did you then drive that car back to your place of business?
  - A Yes.
- Q Was there any conversation in the car with Montanez concerning any of the conversation you had in the apartment?
  - A No, sir.
- Q With reference to the conversation that took place in the apartment, so that we can save some time, will you tell us basically what you recall happened at that particular meeting?

A I walked into the apartment and Arlene Carlton introduced me to Salvemini as Joe and Jerry -- that is the first time I met any one of them- and we talked about negotiating about a kilo of cocaine, right, and I didn't like the way he agreed to everything, you know, so I just told him to forget about it.

And then on my way out of the door, you know, just "Nice meeting you," and everything, on the way out Jerry called Pete, right, and they said something about something, most likely about the eighth.

THE COURT: Who is Pete?

THE WITNESS: Hiram Montanez.

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## Santiago-direct

- Q Did you physically leave the apartment when Montanez was called back?
  - A Yes. I was on the other side of the door.
  - Q And was the door open or closed?
  - A It was like partially open, you know.
  - Q Ajar?
    - A Right, ajar.
- Q Had you reached any agreement with Mr. Salvemini that day about anything?
  - A None whatsoever. None whatsoever.
- Q Was there any discussion with him that they would work out the other plans in the future?
- A On the contrary. I told Pete that if he were to do business with him, that he would go to jail. That's exactly what I told him.
- Q Was that vehicle ever used I am talking about this case -- was it used to transport, facilitate the transportation of any narcotic?
  - A No, sir.
  - Q Was it used to secrets any?
- 22 A No, sir.
  - Q Was it used for any purpose at all in connection with narcotics?
    - A Just to go down and drive and talk to him.

1	lh:mg	Santiago-direct/cross 70
2	Q	That's all?
3	A	That's it.
4		MR. DiRENZO: Your witness.
5	CROSS-EXA	AMINATION
6	BY MR. S	ALERNO:
7	Q	I believe you stated that Pete approached you
8	outside y	your store and told you that he wanted to go to
9	Arlene Ca	arlton's,is that correct?
10	A	Right.
11	Q	Where is your store again?
12	A	52 East 167th Street.
13	Q	Is that in Manhattan or the Bronx?
14	A	Bronx.
15	Q	What did he say to you before you got into the
16	Cadillac	?
17	A	Well, he talked about Joe, right, that he was
18	supposed	
19	Q	What did he say about Joe?
20	A	That he was supposed to be something in some mob
21	or somet	hing, and he was interested in buying some cocaine
22	like a k	ey, right. So I turned around, I said, "All right
23	we will	go down and we will see what's up."
24		We went down and that's what happened.
25	0	So at the time you got into the vehicle you knew

Santiago-cross

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you were going some place where you would discuss cocaine, is that not so?

Right.

- You testified that at the meeting you told Pete or subsequently you told Pete to forget about it?
  - Yes. I told him at my residence.
- That was when Mr. Salvemini, Joe, was not present, is that correct?
  - Right. A
- Did something subsequently occur to change your mind in that respect?
- Yes, because he was too anxious, you know, he just--MR. DiRENZI: If I may, your Honor, when you say "he," will you let the Court know --

THE WITNESS: Joe. I turned around, he was too anxious, everything was "yes" all except for the agreement of as far as he wanted two cars and I wanted to do it my way and he didn't want to.

So I told him, "Forget about it."

That's when Pete got in contact with Jerry, and then that's when I told Pete, I says, "It is up to you."

- Why did you say, "It is up to you" to Pete?
- Because I didn't want to have nothing to do with it.

THE COURT: I assume he is referring to this

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1	lh:mg Santiago-cross 73
2	transaction
3	MR. DiRENZO: Not the way he put the question,
4	your Honor.
5	THE COURT: It will be confined to this transac-
6	tion.
7	Q You did state that you gave Hiram Montanez co-
8	caine, is that not so?
9	A Yes.
10	Q Is that within a few days of the June 7th meet-
11	ing?
12	A Yes.
13	Q Did you know that Hiram Montanez was going to
14	sell that cocaine to Joe?
15	A The eighth I didn't know. The eighth I didn't
16	know about.
17	Q The kilogram you did know about?
18	A Yes.
19	Q You knew he was going to sell that to Joe?
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2	for you to give Pete cocains and not know who he was going

to sell it to?

What do you mean, customary?

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MR. DiRENZO: That's objected to. Hold it.

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Q You testified at the time you pleaded, Mr.

Santiago, if I may read to you and see if you remember making this statement, the Court, referring to pages 10 and 11 of the transcript of your plea of guilty, the Court asked you to describe what you did.

"A Well, your Honor, Hiram Montanez came to me and we talked and we went and met Arlene Carlton, you know, and I gave Hiram Montanez a package.

- "Q You what?
- "A I gave Hiram Montanez the drugs.

THE COURT: Sustained.

- "Q What drugs?
- "A Cocaine.
- "Q What happened?

"A And then Hiram Montanez proceeded to deliver the package, and then the agents picked him up and picked me up, and that was it."

Do you recall making that statement?

A Yes, sir.

THE COURT: That is on June 11?

MR. SALERNO: The date actually is not indicated in the statement that Mr. Santiago is making, your Honor.

THE COURT: The date he was picked up was June 11 when he had the kilo of cocaine, isn't that correct? Where

1	lh:mg Santiago-cross 76
2	bit difficult to understand.
3	THE COURT: Clarify it, Mr. Salerno.
4	Q Do you contend that after the June 7th meeting
5	you adhered to your feeling that Joe was untrustworthy?
6	A Yes.
7	Q Why then did you give Pete cocaine that you
8	supplied to sell to Joe?
9	A I just didn't feel that it was right. He kept
10	on insisting.
11	Q He kept insisting?
12	A Right. So I just let it go.
13	MR. SALERNO: No further questions, your Honor.
14	MR. DiRENZO: No further questions.
15	THE COURT: You may step down.
16	(Witness excused)
17	THE COURT: Any other witnesses?
18	MR. DiRENZO: I had intended to call one, but I
19	will not. I will rest on the testimony of the defendant.
20	THE COURT: Any rebuttal by the Government?
21	MR. SALERNO: No rebuttal, your Honor.
22	The Government rests and respectfully moves for
23	judgment.
24	MR. DiRENZO: The claimant rests, your Honor.
25	We submit that the Government should not obtain judgment

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under these circumstances.

THE COURT: Mr. Salerno, assume that the car had been used to transport the two men ten days before the actual consummation of the sale, would that make any difference?

MR. SALERNO: I shouldn't think so, your Honor, because as I think your Honor--

THE COURT: Suppose it was seven days before?

You say the time nexus has no part at all to do
with it?

MR. SALERNO: If it can be shown that the subsequent sales resulted from that meeting and there was nothing intervening that could be called an intervening cause of the subsequent sales, then I think quite clearly it would have to be held that that meeting to which the car was used to transport the people was in furtherance of the narcotics business and facilitated the sale.

I think it is very important that this was conceded to be an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy,
this meeting, and that the car was used in furtherance of
that, if you will.

MR. DiRENZO: If I may interject, your Honor, it seemed a little bit significant to me, although I know it is not required, but I have seen many indictments, read

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many indictments, where there is a specific meeting at a given time. Some reference in the overt acts is usually made that two parties went to a certain point at a certain time, very often they say they drove to a certain place.

You find a complete absence of this in the overt acts in this indictment.

MR. SALERNO: On the contrary, your Honor, there is specific reference to the June 7th meeting which was elaborated upon by Mr. Vizcarrondo's question at the time.

THE COURT: No. It simply states that on or about June 7 the defendants Arlene Carlton, Hiram Montanez and Ivan Santiago had a conversation. That was the conversation in the apartment.

Baldly stated, your position is that because the car was used to transport the two defendants to the scene of the conversation, that that was a facilitation of the conversation and the sale which subsequently took place.

MR. SALERNO: That is correct. We think that in particular the Pontiac case which is quite close to the facts in this case and holds in our favor--

THE COURT: One of the cases--

MR. SALERNO: Pontiac, 83 F. Sup. at page 999 or

MR. DiRENZO: Is that Judge Rifkind's case?

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THE COURT: One at a time.

We will take Judge Rifkind's case first.

I don't think on its facts it has any substantial bearing on the issues in this case. There Judge Rifkind found the Dodge was an instrumentality in a prearranged scheme of transportation which wasnot compelted by reason of the intervention of narcotics agents.

Also I think it is appropriate to note, and I quite agree with the statement made by Judge Rifkind, where the contraband is not in the vehicle or in the possession of the occupant of the vehicle, what constitutes facilitation is a question of degree, which is in turn a question of fact not readily susceptible to generalization.

It is simply another way of stating that each case must stand on its own facts.

MR. SALERNO: I can't dispute that, your Honor. I believe we quoted that identical language.

MR. DiRENZO: There is also other interesting language, even in Judge Rifkind's decision, if your Honor pleases. Careful reading of that case indicates that he had had I believe only one reported case brought to his attention at the time thathe made his decision in that particular case.

This other language was quite interesting, and

your Honor read part of it in mentioning Judge Rifkind's decision.

The following recital by the Court in making the finding of facilitation, your Honor, and this is a quote, he says, Judge Rifkind: "...was prompted by the inescapable inference which must be brought from the fact that the meeting in the Dodge and the Pontiac was not incidental, but prearranged; in other words, the Dodge was" and I am quoting your language as you mad it "an instrumentality in a prearranged scheme of transportation which was not completed by reason of the intervention of the narcotics agents."

MR. SALERNO: Your Honor, here we have a further admission that Mr. Santiago in his testimony, at the time he got into the Cadillac, to go to Carlton's apartment, he knew that he was going to be talking about cocaine.

THE COURT: What it comes down to is a means of connveyance for him. He could just have readily taken a taxicab and could just have readily walked there, and the transaction wouldhave gone on in the same manner. It didn't make any difference how he got there.

MR. SALERNO: That's true.

THE COURT: The conversation would have taken place, the transaction would have taken place and the eventual sale wouldhave taken place in the same way.

MR. SALERNO: That's true, your Honor. But the statute envisions that when in fact a conveyance is used, we submit in the manner that it was used here, that it is forfeitable.

The same could be said about the transportation of narcotics itself. It could be said that he could have gotten on the subway --

THE COURT: Am I correct that you disagree with the statement in the New Hampshire case that to be forfeited, the Supreme Court must have had some substantial connection to or be instrumental in the commission of the underlying activity which the statute seeks to prevent?

MR. SALERNO: I don't think I disagree with that language. What I do disagree with is a suggestion that is admittedly in some cases, there is a Buick case, I think, in Pennsylvania, that suggests a car is used to facilitate only if it could not have been done in any other way.

That is the implication of the hypothetical that your Honor was presenting me with.

If it is essential that this particular car and no other means of transportation be used -- I submit that argument could be applied to the actual transportation of illicit narcotics -- one could always say they could have

used another means.

I think what the statute intends is that when in fact the automobile is used in a particular way regardless of whether or not they could have gone by subway or any other means, that there is a facilitation.

THE COURT: Don't you think the vehicle must have played some part itself in the furtherance of the transaction other than the mere means of transportation?

MR. SALERNO: We don't think it is mere means, your Honor. We think they drove the Cadillac down there by his own testimony knowing that he was going to talk about narcotics.

We submit that's in furtherance of his narcotics trafficking business.

The statute now reads, as I point out in our memorandum of law, somewhat more broadly than it originally did, that a conveyance used in any manner to facilitate the sale and a conveyance that's used or intended for use--

THE COURT: But then you are factually up against the proposition that as far as intended to be used, the very discussion of the participants in the transaction was to avoid the use of anything except two rented cars, which excludes this car immediately, or to conclude the transaction in an apartment.

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MR. SALERNO: We recognize, your Honor, that there is no evidence here of an intent to use the car for the actual transportation.

The offer of proof that we made was in fact-in the robing room, was intended to convey that there may
be a deliberate attempt to do precisely the opposite, to
use this car for a particular purpose, the showy purpose,
as it were, and to use cheaper cars for the actual transportation.

THE COURT: That is so speculative I would not accept that at all.

MR. SALERNO: We think it is significant that in the Pontiac case the District Court referred to precisely such a possibility. I don't know whether it was in the record--

THE COURT: I will take the matter under advisement.

If you want to submit any other brief you may do so by tomorrow afternoon.

MR. DiRENZO: I think I will rely on the memo that I submitted to your Honor because it covers exactly the same cases and a couple more.

(Court adjourned)

111 (Conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute narcotic drug.) USA-138- 510 - IND. / INT . Rev. 5-27-72 DP:cf UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JUN 20 1974 S Q OF H.

INDICTMENT

74 Cr.

CRIM.

ARLENE CARLTON, HIRAM MONTANEZ a/k/a "Pete" and IVAN SANTIAGO,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

-v-

Defendant s.

The Grand Jury charges:

1. From on or about the 1st day of January, 1974 and continuously thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, in the Southern District of New York,

> ARLENE CARLTON, HIRAM MONTANEZ a/k/a "Pete" and IVAN SANTIAGO

the defendants and others to the Grand Jury unknown, unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other to violate Sections 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21, United States Code.

2. It was part of said conspiracy that the said defendants unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly would distribute and possess with intent to distribute Schedule narcotic drug controlled substances the exact amount thereof being to the Grand Jury unknown in violation of Sections 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21, United States Code.

FXHIBIT U. S. DIST COURT 5. D. OF H. Y.

ISA-33s-511 - p.2 - IND./INF. (Conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute narcotic drug.)



In pursuance of the said conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof, the following overt acts were committed in the Southern District of New York.

- 1. On or about June 6, 1974 the defendant ARLENE CARLTON introduced a man to the defendant HIRAM MONTANEZ a/k/a "Pete".
- 2. On or about June 7, 1974 the defendants ARLENE CARLTON, HIRAM MONTANEZ and IVAN SANTIAGO had a conversation.
- 3. On or about June 10, 1974 the defendant HIRAM MONTANEZ a/k/a "Pete" delivered a package containing approximately 1/8th kilogram of cocaine at 305 East 24th Street, Apartment 19C, New York, N. Y.
- 4. On or about June 10, 1974 the defendant HIRAM MONTANEZ a/k/a "Pete" received approximately \$4,000.
- 5. On or about June 11, 1974 the defendant HIRAM MONTANEZ a/k/a "Pete" drove an automobile from the vicinity of Walton Ave., Bronx, N. Y. to 138th Street and Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y.

(Title 21, United States Code, Section 846.)

Rev. 5-1 .7'

# A 113

DP:cf

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### SECOND COUNT

The Grand Jury further charges:

On or about the 10th day of June, 1974
in the Southern District of New York,

ARLENE CARLTON, HIRAM MONTANEZ a/k/a "Pete" and IVAN SANTIAGO

the defendants , unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did distribute and possess with intent to distribute a Schedule II narcotic drug controlled substance, to wit, approximately 1/8th kilogram of cocaine.

(Title 21, United States Code, Sections 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).)

Rev. 5-27-72

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## THIRD COUNT

The Grand Jury further charges:

On or about the 11th day of June, 1974
in the Southern District of New York,

HIRAM MONTANEZ a/k/a "Pete"

the defendant , unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did

\*\*MUSCONDECEXANCE possess with intent to distribute a

Schedule II narcotic drug controlled substance, to wit,

approximately 1 kilogram of cocaine.

(Title 21, United States Code, Sections 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).)

DP:cf

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### FOURTH COUNT

The Grand Jury further charges:

On or about the 11th day of June, 1974 in the Southern District of New York,

### IVAN SANTIAGO

Title 21, United States Code, Sections 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).)

FOREMAN SURVINE

PAUL J. CURRAN United States Attorney

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RAYMOND F. BURGHANDT Clerk
RAYMOND F. BURGHANDT Clerk
Deputy Clerk

MOTHE IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK No. 74 crim. 62 HITED STATES OF AMERICA. Plaintiff, PETITION TO ENTER PLEA OF GUILTY (Fed. R. Cr. Proc., v. Rules 10 and 11) HIRAM MONTANEZ Defendant. The defendant above named respectfully represents to the

ourt as follows:

(1) My full true name is: HIRAM MOUTAKEY

and I request that all proceedings against me be had in the name mich I here declare to be my true name.

- (2) I am represented by counsel and the name of my SIDNEY G SPARROW ittorney is:
- (3) I have received a copy of the indictment (information) before being called upon to plead, and have read and disrussed it with my attorney, and believe and feel that I understand every accusation made against me in this case.
- (4) I have told my attorney the facts and surrounding circonstances as known to me concerning the settern mentioned in the indictment (information), and believe and feel that my attorney is fully informed as to all such matters. My attorney has rince informed me, and has councelled and advised with me, as to the nature and cause of every accusation against me, and as to any possible defenses I might have in this case.
- (5) My attorney has advised me that the punishment which the law provides, is as follows: A manimum of 15 years imprisonment (and a minimum of o years imprisonment) and a fine of \$25000 for the offense charged in (Count I of the indictment (information);

also that probation may or may not be granted; and that if I plead "GUILTY" to more than one offense, the court may order the sentence to be served consecutively, one after another.

(6) I understand that I may, if I so choose, plead "Not Guilty" to any offense charged against me, and that if I choose to plead "Not Guilty" the Constitution guarantees me: (a) the right to a speedy and public trial by jury: (b) the right to nee and hear all witnesses against me; (c) the right to use the power and process of the coart to compel the production of any evidence, including the attendance of any witnesses, in my favor; and (d) the right to have the assistance of counsel in my defense at all itua s of the proceedings.

- (7) I also understand that if I plead "GUILTY" the court may impose the same punishment as if I had pleaded "Not Guilty", stood trial and been convicted by a jury.
- (8) I declare that no officer or agent of any branch of government (Federal, State or local), nor any other person has made any premise or suggestion of any kind to me, or within my knowlege to anyone else, that I would receive a lighter sentence, or probation, or any other form of leniency, if I would plead "GUILTY". I hope to receive probation, but am prepared to accept any punishment permitted by law which the court may see fit to impose.

(Fed. R. Crim. Proc., Rule 32(E)).

- (9) I believe and feel that my attorney has done all that anyone could do to counsel and assist me, and that I now understand the proceedings in this case against me.
- from anyone who claims to be innocent and, with that in mind and because I make no claim of innocence, I wish to plead "GUILTY", and respectfully request the court to accept my plea, as follows:

  (\*) GUILTY AS CHARGETO WE CECATT
- (11) I declare that I offer my plea of "GUILTY" freely and voluntarily and of my own accord; also that my attorney has explained to me, and I feel and believe I understand, the statements set forth in the indichment (information), and in this petition, and in the "Certificate of Counsel" which is attached to this petition.
- (12) I further state that I wish the court to omit and consider as waived by me all reading of the indicement (information) in open court, and all further proceedings upon my arraignment, and I pray the court to enter now my plea of "GUILTY" as set fouth above in paragraph 10 of this petition, in reliance upon my statements made in this petition.

Signed by me in open court in the presence of my attorney this /2 day of #1#4/ , 1975.

Huan Mortanez

(\*) The defendant's plea of "GUILTY" or "Not Guilty" as to each offense charged against him should be entered in the blank space provided in paragraph 10. If but a single offense is charged, the defendant who wishes to plead "GUILTY" should write in paragraph 10: "GUILTY" as charged in the indictment (information. If more than one offense be charged, the defendant may write in paragraph 10: "GUILTY" as charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_\_ of the indictment (information), etc. "Not Guilty" as charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_\_, etc.

The undersigned, as attorney and counsellor for the . defendant above named HIRAM MENTANEZ hereby certifies as follows:

- (1) I have read and fully explained to the defendant all the accusations against the defendant which are set forth in the indictment (information) in this case;
- (2) To the best of my knowledge and belief each statement set forth in the foregoing petition is in all respects accurate and true;
- (3) The plea of "GUILTY", as offered by the defendant in paragraph 10 of the foregoing petition, accords with my understanding of the facts as related to me by the defendant, and is consistent with my advice to the defendant;
- (4) In my opinion the defendant's waiver of all reading of the indictment (information) in open court, and of all further proceedings upon arraignment as provided in Rule 10, is voluntarily and understandingly made; and I recommend to the court that the waiver be accepted by the court;
- (5) In my opinion the plea of "GUILTY", as offered by the defendant in paragraph 10 of the foregoing petition, is voluntarily and understandingly made; and I recommend to the court but the plea of 'GUILT' be now accepted and entered on behalf of the defendant as requested in paragraph 10 of the foregoing petition.

Signed by me in open court in the presence of the defendant above named this 12 day of MAY 1975.

Jattorney for the Defendant

### ORDER

Good cause appearing therefor from the foregoing petition of the defendant above named and the certificate of his counsel, and from all proceedings heretofore had in this case, IT IS ORDERED that the petition be granted and that the defendant's plea of "GUILTY" be accepted and entered as prayed in the petition and as recommended in the certificate of counsel.

Done in open court this 12 day of May 1945.

United States District Judge

IN AND UNITED STATES METRICE COURT

12 1975 S O OF N

# SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,

I van autigs Defendant.

No. 7 Crim. 623

PETITION TO ENTER

PLEA OF GUILTY

(Fed. R. Cr. Proc.,

Rules 10 and 11)

The defendant above named respectfully represents to the Court as follows:

(1) My full true name is: ( Van Santiago

and I request that all proceedings against me be had in the name which I here declare to be my true name.

- attorney is: Wichael Tilkevio 4 4. Ellioy Consel
- (3) I have received a copy of the indictment (information) before being called upon to plead, and have read and discussed it with my attorney, and believe and feel that I understand every accusation made against me in this case.
- (4) I have told my attorney the facts and surrounding circumstances as known to me concerning the matters mentioned in the indictment (information), and believe and feel that my attorney is fully informed as to all such matters. My attorney has since informed me, and has councelled and advised with me, as to the nature and cause of every accusation against me, and as to any possible defenses I might have in this case.
- which the law provides, is as follows: A maximum of pears imprisonment (and a minimum of years imprisonment) and a fine of \$ 21.40 for the offense charged in (Count of the indictment (information);

also that probation may or may not be granted; and that if I plead "GUILTY" to more than one offense, the court may order the sentence to be served consecutively, one after another.

(6) I understand that I may, if I so choose, plead "Not Guilty" to any offense charged against me, and that if I choose to plead "Not Guilty" the Constitution guarantees me: (a) the right to a speedy and public trial by jury; (b) the right to see and hear all witnesses against me; (c) the right to use the power and process of the court to compel the production of any evidence, including the attendance of any witnesses, in my favor; and (d) the right to have the assistance of counsel in my defense at all stages of the proceedings.

- (7) I also understand that if I plead "GUILTY" the court may impose the same punishment as if I had pleaded "Not Guilty", stood trial and been convicted by a jury.
- (8) I declare that no officer or agent of any branch of government (Federal, State or local), nor any other person has made any promise or suggestion of any kind to me, or within my knowlege to anyone else, that I would receive a lighter sentence, or probation, or any other form of leniency, if I would plead "GUILTY". I hope to receive probation, but am prepared to accept any punishment permitted by law which the court may see fit to impose.

(Fed. R. Crim. Proc., Rule

- (9) I believe and feel that my attorney has done all that anyone could do to counsel and assist me, and that I now understand the proceedings in this case against me.
- (10). I know the court will not accept a plea of "GUILTY" from anyone who claims to be innocent and, with that in mind and because I make no claim of innocence, I wish to plead "GUILTY", and respectfully request the court to accept my plea, as follows:

  (\*) C+ (- (OMSYNKACM)
- (11) I declare that I offer my plea of "CUILTY" freely and voluntarily and of my own accord; also that my attorney has explained to me, and I feel and believe I understand, the statements set forth in the indictment (information), and in this petition, and in the "Certificate of Counsel" which is attached to this petition.
- (12) I further state that I wish the court to omit and consider as waived by me all reading of the indicement (information) in open court, and all further proceedings upon my arraignment, and I pray the court to enter now my plea of "GUILTY" as set forth above in paragraph 10 of this petition, in reliance upon my statements made in this petition.

Signed by me in open court in the presence of my attorney

this 124h day of May, 1971.

More Santinge

<sup>(\*)</sup> The defendant's plea of "GUILTY" or "Not Guilty" as to each offense charged against him should be entered in the blank space provided in paragraph 10. If but a single offense is charged, the defendant who wishes to plead "GUILTY" should write in paragraph 10: "GUILTY" as charged in the indictment (information. If more than one offense be charged, the defendant may write in paragraph 10: "GUILTY" as charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_\_ of the indictment (information), etc. "Not Guilty" as charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_\_, etc.

CLATITICATE OF COUNSELL

The undersigned, as attorney and counsellor for the defendant above named Van Lucio hereby certifies as follows:

- (1) I have read and fully explained to the defendant all the accusations against the defendant which are set forth in the indictment (information) in this case;
- (2) To the best of my knowledge and belief each statement set forth in the foregoing petition is in all respects accurate and true;
- (3) The plea of "GUILTY", as offered by the defendant in paragraph 10 of the foregoing petition, accords with my understanding of the facts as related to me by the defendant, and is consistent with my advice to the defendant;
- (4) In my opinion the defendant's waiver of all reading of the indictment (information) in open court, and of all further proceedings upon arraignment as provided in Rule 10, is voluntarily and understandingly made; and I recommend to the court that the waiver be accepted by the court;
- (5) In my opinion the plea of "GUILTY", as offered by the defendant in paragraph 10 of the foregoing petition, is voluntarily and understandingly made; and I recommend to the court that the plea of "GUILTY" be now accepted and entired on behalf of the defendant as requested in paragraph 10 of the foregoing petition.

defendant above named this 1411 day of 11411 1911

Attorney for the Defendant

### ORDER

Good cause appearing therefor from the foregoing petition of the defendant above named and the certificate of his counsel, and from all proceedings heretofore had in this case, IT IS GRDERED that the petition be granted and that the defendant's plea of "GUILTY" be accepted and entered as prayed in the petition and as recommended in the certificate of counsel.

Done in open court this 12 day of May 1975.

United States District Judge

# United States Bistrict Court

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

208

ARIENE CARLTON,
HIRAM MONTANEZ a/k/a "Pete" and
IVAN SANTIAGO,

Defendants.

NDICTMENT

74 Cr.

(21, USC \$\$846, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).)

PAUL J. CURRAN

United States Attorney

A TRUE BILL

Poreman

PPI - 88 - 5-19-11 - 788 - 685

S. DISTRICT COLL S. JUN 20 1974

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(over)

MAY 12 1975 DEFT (ATTY SIDNEY STARROW PRESENT) STARROW WITHDRAWS PLEA OF NOT GUILTY AND NOW PLEADS GUILTY TO COUNT I OF THIS INDICT. SENT. AOVA. TO 6-12-75 11:30 AM P.S.I ORDERED PORIL CONTO. MAY 12 1975 DEFT (ATTY ELLIOTT WALES PRESENT) SANTIAGO WITHOLDING PLEA OF NOTGULLY AND AION PLEADS GULLY TO Count OF THIS INDICT SENT ACTO 6-12-75, 11.30 P.S.I ORDERED BAIL CONT'S. mothy of JUN 12 1975 DEFT (ATTY MICHAEL D. RENZO PRESENT) SANTIAGO, SENTENCED AS A YOUNG ADULT OFFENDER PURSUANT TO 5010 (A) OF TITLE 18, U.S.C. AS EXTENDED BY SEC. 4209 OF TITLE 18. U.S.C. PROBATION FOR A PERIOD OF SYRIPSIEST TO THE STAND NE PROBATION ORDER OF THIS COURT. SPEC TOND THEN OF PROBATION, DEFT TO MAKE SPECIAL EFFORT TO ORTAIN HIGH SCHOOL EQUIV. DIPLOMA CATE ORFID TOLINE DISMITE EO ON MOTION OF DETTE COURSEL ATT. OF TOMESUT OF THE GOVERNMENT. DEFTATY GIBBLE SPARROUS PRESENT) MONTRISEZ, GENTEMED TO SYNEN EXECUTION OF SENTENCE IS SUSPENDED I ST PLACED ON PROBATION FOR SYRS SUBJECT TO TOS SHOWEING KRODATION DIGER OF THIS COURT. SPECIAL CONDITION OF PROPORTION, DEFT GET A JUB WITHIN 70 DAYS DR GO TO COLLEGE. OPEN COUNTS DISMISSED ON MOTION OF DEFTS COUNSEL WITH THE CONSENT OF THE GOVT.

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Notee

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

ONE 1974 CADILLAC ELDORADO SEDAN,

SERIAL NO. 6L47S4Q407966,

Defendant.

74 Civ. 4508 (EW)

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the United States of America, plaintiff above named, hereby appeals to the United StatesCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit from the order and judgment of this Court denying forfeiture, dismissing the complaint, and directing the United States to release the defendant vehicle to the claimant, entered in this action on March 4, 1976.

Dated: New York, New York

April 5, 1976

ROBERT B. FISKE, JR. United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Attorney for Plaintiff

By:

Veter ( Salerno PETER C. SALERNO Assistant United States Attorney Office & P.O. Address: U. S. Courthouse Annex One St. Andrew's Plaza New York, New York 10007 Telephone: 791-1979

TO:

MICHAEL P. DIRENZO, ESQ. Attorney for Claimant Ivan Santiago 15 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10023

CLERK, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT United States Courthouse Foley Square New York, New York 10007

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